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Notes and Comment
Attorney and Client: Action for Compensation by Attorney upon
Discharge by Client: Quantum Meruit or Contract?-In two recent
decisions, Martin v. Camp, 219 N. Y. 170 (1916), and Kushner v.
Ferris, 219 N. Y. 192 (Ix6), the Court of Appeals of New York
has held that, where a client has employed an attorney to prosecute
certain claims, and has agreed to pay the attorney for his services
a percentage of the amount recovered, and subsequently discharges
the first attorney and employs a new one, who conducts the litigation
to a favorable outcome, the discharged attorney has a right of action
against his client in a case where the attorney is -without fault;
but that the action is upon a quantum reruit, and cannot be maintained upon the contract. In the case of Martin v. Camp, supra,
the attorney's claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and the
question as to whether the suit was on the contract or upon a quantum
neruit need not necessarily have been determined. However, in
the Kushner case that question came squarely before the court.
This precise question has been before the Court of Appeals but
once before.' The court in its present examination of the question
seems to have overlooked some important points, and to have
construed away an express legislative enactment.2 The basis for
the apparently erroneous decision in the Kushner case lies in a
mistaken assumption as to what the previous decisions of the court
have held. It is unquestionably established that a client may at any
'Marsh v. Holbrook, 3 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 176 (1869). In this case the
plaintiff, an attorney, entered into a contract with the defendant to prosecute
the defendant's suit. His fee was to be $5000, if he succeeded in the case. Subsequently the defendant settled the litigation, and the plaintiff sued on his contract
of employment. The defendant sought to limit plaintiff's recovery to a guantum
meruit by offering evidence to show the value of the attorney's services. This
evidence was excluded. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff could at
least
pro rata
hisagreement
contract. with
James,
in the course
opinion from
said:
"The recover
defendants
by on
their
thej.,plaintiff
were of
nothisdebarred
discontinuing said action, but in doing so, they only terminated said action,
they did not put an end to their contract with the plaintiff. I think the rule is,
that where performance is prevented or arrested by one party, the other has the
election either to treat the contract as rescinded and recover upon a quantum
meruit the value of the services rendered, or to sue upon the contract and recover
for what has been done, at the stipulated price, and for loss, in profits or otherwise,
sustained by the operation." The learned judge further states that "Since the
adoption of the code (in which sec. 474 of the Judiciary Law then appeared) there
is nothing to prevent an attorney from agreeing with his client as to the amount
and terms of his compensation." Woodruff, J., with whom Mason, J., concurred,
said: "Whether the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the whole contract
pice, it was not necessary to consider, as he has not appealed from the judgment."
Murray and Hunt, JJ., also concurred, except that they were further of the
opinion that there was substantial performance by the plaintiff, and that he
would be entitled to recover the whole contract price. Grover and Daniels,
JJ., dissented.
2Sec. 474 of the judiciary Law.
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time, and without any cause, discharge his attorney.3 This doctrine
is well established in the general law of agency.4 The principal
has the power to terminate his agent's activity at any time and without any cause; and the relation of client and attorney is that of principal and agent. A statute in this state provides that the relation
between attorney and client is contractual and the authorities and
text writers also agree that it is.5 From the cases which hold that
the client has the power to discharge his attorney, and thus terminate
his activity, the court in the Martin case concludes that he has the
right to terminate the contract for compensation; and that it follows
that if the client has this right, he cannot be made to respond in
damages for exercising this right. If the premise were correct,
the conclusion would necessarily follow. But is the premise sound?
Does it follow that because he may terminate the relationship, i.e.,
the authority of the attorney to represent him, he has the right so to
do, thereupon relieving himself from liability in an action for damages
for breach of contract? In the law of agency it is a well recognized
principle that where the agent has been employed for a definite time
at a definite compensation, the principal has the power to terminate
the agent's authority so that his acts will no longer bind him,6 but
that he does not have the legal right so to do, and, where the contract
of agency is bilateral, the principal must respond to the agent in
damages for the breach of the contract of agency.7 Whether the
contract between attorney and client for compensation is contingent
upon success, or is for a specified fee, it would appear that normally
the contract is bilateral, and for a definite time, i.e., until the litigation is concluded.
The cases in New York do not establish any right on the part of
the client to terminate at will the agreement for compensation.
The client may terminate the contract for compensation in certain
instances where the contract "is restrained by law" as provided for
in the latter part of sec. 474 of the Judiciary Law. For instance,
he may terminate the contract for compensation and throw the
attorney back to a recovery upon a quantum meruit, if he settles his
case before a decision is reached. 8 This portion of the statute is
based upon public policy which encourages settlements. But where
the attorney is discharged, and afterward a second attorney prosecutes the claim to judgment, the authorities relied upon in the
principal cases do not establish the position that the court takes
that such discharge precludes an action on the contract. It is true
that dicta to this effect appear in previous cases, which is probably
due to the failure of the court to differentiate a power from a right.
gAndrewes
v. Haas, 214 N. Y. 255 (1915), and cases cited therein.
4
Taylor v. Burns, 203 U. S. 120 (19o6); Gardner v. Pierce, 131 App. Div.

(N. Y.) 6o5 (19o9); Oppenheimer v. Barnett, 131 App. Div. (N. Y.) 614 (1909).
6judiciary Law, sec. 474; Marsh v. Holbrook, supra, note i.
76See supra, note 4.
Alworth v. Seymour, 42 Minn. 526 (i89o); Huffeut on Agency (2d ed.), sec.
64, and cases there cited.
sAndrewes v. Haas, supra, note 3; Matter of Snyder, igo N. Y. 66 (1907).
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III

The confusion seems to have had its beginning in the case of
Trust v. Repoor, 15 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 57o (1856). In this case
Hoffman, J., in the -course of his opinion states that a client "has
the right to discharge his attorney at any time, with or without
cause." This statement is purely dictum, but was adopted by Earl,
J., as the authority for his dictum in Tenny v. Berger,9 where he states
that a "client may discharge his attorney, arbitrarily, without cause,
at any time, and is liable to pay him for only the services which he
actually rendered up to the time of his discharge." This statement
was not necessary to the decision in the case, and Trust v. Repoor,
cited as authority for it,10 is not authority for two reasons: first, it
was merely a dictum, and secondly the case did not limit expressly
the right of recovery of the attorney to a quantum meruit, although
this inference might be drawn from the opinion.
In Martin v. Camp, supra, the court referred to its previous
decision in Marsh v. Holbrook, saying that the question whether an
attorney should recover damages as for breach of contract or upon a
quantum meruit was discussed, and that while two of the judges
thought the attorney should recover the full contract price, that point
was not decided, as the attorney did not appeal. This review of
Marsh v. Holbrook is misleading, giving the impression that the actual
decision went only so far as to allow a recovery on the quantum
meruit, when in fact the point decided was that the recovery was upon
the contract for damages, and not upon a quantum meruit. The
defendant offered evidence as to the reasonable value of the attorney's
services, and this evidence was excluded. The referee allowed the
attorney a pro rata of the contract price based upon the amount of
work actually done, when the attorney abandoned the part of his
complaint claiming reasonable value and said he relied only on the
special agreement. In affirming this allowance the court of necessity
held the attorney was not limited to a quantum meruit, but that the
action was for breach of the special contract. Whether in such a
case the measure of damages should be the entire contract price,
instead of a pro rata portion thereof, based upon the relation of the
work done to that contemplated, was the question that was not
decided.
The court in the Martin case cites three other authorities.
Andrewes v. Haas," Matter of Dunn,2 and Johnson v. Ravitch. 3 An
examination of these cases will reveal that this question was not
involved in any of them, and whatever the court said in relation to
it is dicta. If the above analysis is correct, at the time that the
Martin case came before the court there was precedent that the
client had the power to terminate his attorney's authority, but not
the right to do so. 14 The court proceeds then to make an exception,
193
0 N. Y. 524 (1883).
2 Odger v. Delvin, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 631 (1819), and Gustine v. Stoddard,
(N. Y.) 99 (i88o), were also cited, but neither of these cases are in point.
lISupra, note 3.
"2205 N. Y. 398 (1912).
1113
App. Div. (N. Y.) 8io (19o6).
14Marsh v. Holbrook, supra, note I.

23 Hun
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and this exception is made law by the decision in the Kushner
case.
Whether the agreement for compensation is for a fixed sum, or contingent upon success or for a percentage of the proceeds, and the suit
is carried to a conclusion, the statute would seem to demand that the
agreement control, and that the measure of damages is the contract
price. If the client terminates the relation, not to end the litigation
but merely through caprice, and gets another to carry on the proceedings, what principle of law or of public policy necessitates an
interference with the agreement as to fees? The amount recoverable
when complete performance is prevented may be a matter for difference of opinion, but this is a problem of damages. Where the fee
is contingent and the attorney sues before the litigation is ended,
it might be too speculative to measure the damages by any calculation
based upon the contingent fee. But if the suit is brought after the
litigation is successfully terminated, whether by settlement or
judgment, there is a definite basis for calculation.
Contracts for contingent fees are lawful in New York.15 The fact
that the fee is very much larger because of its contingent character
has not led the courts to hold that it is unconscionable. 16 The
courts have recognized the "right of the attorney to be compensated
for his risk where he completes his services according to the contract.
If the client at any time before the completion of these services may
rightfully terminate the contingent agreement, he may wait until
the attorney has made a successful outcome of the litigation seem
dertain, decide that he is paying his attorney too much, secure another
attorney to finish the litigation at a small cost, and compel the first
attorney to take the reasonable value of his services rendered, without
any reference to the risk that he took of getting nothing. This is
practically holding that an attorney can not contract for the value
of his risk, impliedly overruling the previous cases holding that he
may so contract.
But whatever principle may be adopted in determining the measure
of damages in cases of this character, even if in all cases the court
thinks the measure should be only the reasonable value of the attorney's services actually rendered, still does it follow that the action
must be upon the theory of a quantum ineruit instead of on the contract? In New York it makes no difference so far as the statute of
limitations is concerned, whether recovery is on one theory or another,
but in states where a different period of limitation of actions is applied
as between actions on implied contracts and actions on express
contracts, or, as between contracts in writing and those not in
writing, the distinction is often vital.
The holding in the two principal cases seems to go a long way
toward nullifying sec. 474 of the Judiciary Law. This statute,
originally sec. 258 of the Code of 1848, was passed in order to allow
UMatter
of Fitzsimmons, 174 N. Y. i5 (1903).
16Matter of Fitzsimmons, supra, note I5.
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an attorney to contract for his services in place of having its value
determined by a statutory fee bill. 7
If the holding in the two principal cases is correct, the inquiry
arises as to when the compensation of an attorney may be governed
by express agreement. These two cases say in effect only when he
has fully performed his services as called for under the contract.
But if the client has the power not only to terminate the relation,
but also the right to terminate the agreement as to fees, why has he
not this right after the services have been rendered? If it is a right,
is there any limitation as to when the right is to be exercised, and if
there is, what is the reason for any such limitation? Why not limit
the attorney to a quantum meruit after the services have been completed, and disregard the agreement? The evident answer is that
sec. 474 forbids it. But if the contract is a good and binding contract
at one stage, why is it not just as good and binding at another?
The answer that the client has the power to terminate it is not
satisfactory. He must also have the right, and the right does not
necessarily follow from the power, as is shown by the agency cases
cited.' 8 Previous cases have recognized the power. The principal
cases give the right. No impelling necessity seems to require this
extension; it puts an unnecessary limitation on sec. 474, and works
a hardship on the attorney. A more satisfactory result and one that
seems to be correct on principle is arrived at in some other jurisdictions' 9
Geo. W. Dunn, '8.
Carriers: Duty to Protect Passengersfrom Wrongful Act of Third
Person.-In Fennell v. A. T. 6&S. F. Ry. Co., 158 Pac. (Kan.) 14
(1916), the plaintiffs were colored people, man and wife. They
were in a station awaiting the arrival of one of defendant's trains,
which, it was proved at the trial, was due ninety minutes later,
although at the moment plaintiffs were ignorant of the schedule
time. A town marshal came to the door of the station and after
some conversation with defendant's agent, ordered the plaintiffs
to move on, saying that no train was due until the next day. The
plaintiffs offered to purchase tickets but the marshal forcibly ejected
them from the station, during all of which time the agent stood passively by. As a result of their abusive treatment the plaintiffs
received injuries for which this action is brought. It is claimed that
the agent should have protected them from the violence of the
marshal. The court summarily disposes of the question thus:
"But assuming, without deciding, that the plaintiffs were entitled
to the protection of passengers waiting in the depot to take a train,
we find no sufficient basis in reason or in precedent for holding that
27Rooney v. Second Ave. R. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 368, 370 (1858), citing Ward v.
Supra, note 4, and see especially the quotation from the opinion, note i,

Syme,
18 9 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 16, 23-24 (x854).

Supra.
(9Myers v. Crockett, i4 Tex. 257 (i855); Moyer v. Cantieny, 4, Minn. 242
(889).
For a collection of cases see 6 C. J.724, notes 9 and io.
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it was the duty of the agent to venture upon any dictation to or any
interference with one so distended with his little brief authority as
was the star actor in this scene of expulsion."
Rather more than ordinary care is required from a carrier in
protecting its passengers from ill treatment by third persons. In
some jurisdictions the highest degree of care is demanded and the
slightest negligence is ground for liability.! But it is always held
that the carrier is no insurer against such occurrences; its duties
are relative and contingent, not absolute and unconditional.2 The
universal rule is well stated in Button v. S. & N. Ala. Rd. Co.,3 as
follows: "While not required to furnish a police force sufficient
to overcome all force, when unexpectedly and suddenly offered,
it is his (the carrier's) duty to provide ready help sufficient to protect
the passengers from assaults from every quarter from which they
might reasonably be expected to occur, under the circumstances
of the case and the condition of the parties."
In the principal case the situation is complicated by the fact that
the wrongdoer was vested with some degree of public authority.
The servants of a carrier are not ordinarily bound to place themselves
in opposition to or question the authority of officers engaged in
taking a passenger into custody.4 But if they have notice that the
arrest is wrongful, inquiry should be made and, if justified, they
should interfere in behalf of the passenger.-' Here the marshal's
mistreatment of the plaintiffs was so evidently for no reasons other
than race prejudice and self-importance that the agent's failure to
interfere seems to amount to negligence.
The principal case is disposed of without consideration of the
question as to whether or not the plaintiffs were, in fact, passengers.
It is not necesssary that the person shall have actually boarded the
carrier's conveyance before the relation of passenger and carrier,
with the peculiar rules governing that relation, exists. One who goes
to a station within a reasonable time before the departure of a train,
and there, by purchase of a ticket or otherwise, manifests his intention
to take passage, is entitled to all the rights and privileges of a passen'Mullan v. Wis. Cent. Rd. Co., 46 Minn. 474 (1891); Spires v. A. C. L. Rd.
Co., 92 S. C. 564 (1912); Connell v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 93 Va. 44 (1896); N. & W.
Ry.
Co. v. Birchfield, 1O5 Va. 8og (19o6).
2
C. & A. Rd. Co. v. Pillsbury, 8 N. E. (I1.) 803 (1886); Mullan v. Wis. Cent.
Rd. Co., supra, note I; Ill. Cent. Rd. Co. v. Minor, 69 Miss. 710 (1892); P. Ft.
W. & C. Ry. Co. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. St. 512 (1866); Fredericks v. North. Cent. Rd.
Co., 157 Pa. St. 103 (1893); Connell v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., supra,note I; N. & W.
Rd. Co. v. Birchfield, supra, note I.
377 Ala. 591 (1884). See also Culberson v. Empire Coal Co., 156 Ala. 416
(I9O8); Farrier v. C. S. R. T. Ry. Co., 42 Colo. 331 (i9o8); Holly v. Atlanta
St. Rd., 6I Ga. 215 (878); L. E. & W. Rd. Co. v. Arnold, 26 Ind. App. I9o
(I9OI); Putnam v. Broadway and Seventh Ave. Rd. Co., 55 N. Y. iO8 (1873);
Wachser v. Int. R. T. Co., 69 Misc. (N. Y.) 346 (rgio); MeMahon v. Int. R. T.
CO., 59 Misc. (N. Y.) 242 (1908); Koch v. B. H. Rd. Co., 75 App. Div. (N. Y.)
282 (1902).
4

B. & W. Rd. Co. v. Ponder, I I7 Ga. 63 (1902); Burton v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R.
Co., 147 App. Div. (N. Y.) 557 (1873); Owens v. W. & W. Rd. Co., 126 N. C.
139 (19oo); Duggan v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 159 Pa. St. 248 (1893).
5Hutchinson on Carriers, sec. 987.
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ger.6 The plaintiffs were at defendant's depot ninety minutes before
train time which does not seem to be more than a reasonable time
to be permitted to remain in the waiting room.
It is submitted that the learned court erred in its holding that the
agent was not bound to interfere with the marshal acting in his
official capacity, inasmuch as the agent had notice that the marshal's
course of action was without color of authority.
Donald H. Hershey, '18.
Constitutional Law: Naturalization: Who is a White Person?
A Filipino whose paternal grandfather was a full-blooded Spaniard,
but whose mother and paternal grandmother were native Filipinos,
petitioned for naturalization. The Federal court in In re Lampitoe,
232 Fed. 382 (i916), refused the petition, holding that he was not
-within the statute that permits the naturalization of "white persons."
This decision raises two interesting questions. What ethnological
stocks are to be considered "white" within the statutory meaning?
Conceding that a certain racial stock is non-white, what admixture
of white blood is necessary to make the progeny "white"?
The phrase "white persons" has been in our naturalization laws
since x79 o , except for a brief period from 1873 to 1875 when it was
omitted from the revised statutes by mistake. When it was first
adopted three peoples inhabited American territory, the American
aborigines, European colonists and their descendants, and African
negroes and their descendants. Of these peoples the Europeans alone
were moved by the migratory impulse. The aborigines were merely
occupying the land of their fathers, and the negroes immigrated,
not of their own free will, but by force. Therefore, there can be
little doubt that the framers of our first naturalization law contemplated no further possible sources of naturalized citizens than these.
To them, the phrase "white persons" meant only that, of these
three peoples, the negroes and the Indians should not be privileged to
become citizens.' With the extension of American territory to the
Pacific coast and the resultant trans-Pacific traffic, new problems
arose. Chinese immigration was early thought to be fraught with
peril to our culture, and the courts seized upon the limitation of
naturalization to "white persons" as one means of coping with this
yellow peril, 2 but since the passage of the Act of May 6, 1882, specifically excluding Chinese from naturalization, the question as to
6Exton v. Central Rd. of N. J., 62 N. J. L. 7 (1898), aftd. 63 N. J. L. 356 (1899);
T. & P. Ry. Co., v. Jones, 39 S. W. (Tex.) 124 (1897); N. & W. R. R. Co. v.
Galliher, 89 Va. 639 (1893).
'An American Indian is not a white person. In re Burton, I Alaska i i i
(1910); In re Camille, 6 Fed. 256 (188o). Compare In re Rodriguez, 81 Fed.

337 (I897), where a Mexican of Indian ancestry was admitted to citizenship,
but this is seemingly as a result of treaties. See also U. S. v. Perryman, 1oo U. S
235 (1879), where a negro was held to be not a white person within the meaning
of a statute that required white persons stealing from Indians to repay double
the value.
For a discussion of the colonial meaning of the phrase "white persons," see
In re Halladjian, 174 Fed. 834 (1909).
'In re Ah Yup, 5 Sawy. (U. S.) 115 (1878).
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whether they are "white" persons loses its importance. 3 However,
the reasons, good or bad, that debar the Chinese from naturalization
apply with equal force to their allied racial stocks, and the courts
have refused to naturalize Japanese, 4 Burmese, 5 or Filipinos,6 on
the ground that they are Mongolians. Hawaiians also are ineligible
for naturalization.7 The great problem as to what races are "white"
will arise with increased inunigration from the portions of southern
and southwestern Asia where dark aboriginal peoples have been
overborne by successive waves of Caucasian invaders and an inextricable mingling of blood has resulted. That the courts will be liberal
in their interpretation is foreshadowed by the few cases that have
arisen. Inhabitants of Asia Minor who are generally conceded to be
of mixed Semitic origin are held to be "white persons." 8 So also are
Parsees, 9 and high-cast Hindus of Aryan descent. 10
How much white blood is necessary in one of mixed blood to entitle
him to the privilege of naturalization is an open question. Certainly
one who has one-half or more non-white blood cannot be said to be
"white."'" No case has arisen under the naturalization laws where
the applicant has had less than one-half non-white blood, so for light
on this problem it is necessary to search the cases concerning other
statutes in which racial distinctions are drawn. 2 These cases vary
from decisions holding that the slightest preponderance of white
blood makes one "white,"' 3 to a dictum that "white" in legislation
3

in re Hong Yen Chang, 84 Cal. 163 (1890); In re Gee Hop, 71 Fed. 274 (1895) .
SIn re Yamishita, 30 Wash. 234 (1902); In re Buntaro Kumagai, 163 Fed.
922 (1908); In re Saito, 62 Fed. 126 (1894).

Matter of San C. Po, 7 Misc. (N. Y.) 471 (1894).
re Alverto, x98 Fed. 688 (1912); accord, principal case.
re Kanaka Nian, 21 Pac. (Utah) 993 (1889).
1n re Najour, 174 Fed. 734 (1909); In re Halladjian, supra, note I; In re
Mudarri, 176 Fed. 465 (1910); In re Ellis, 179 Fed. ioo (I9io); Dow v. U. S.,
2269 Fed. 145 (1915).
U. S. v. Balsara, i8o Fed. 694 (1910).
10 1n re Mozundar, 207 Fed. 115 (1913).
uSee principal case. Accord, In re Alberto, supra, note 6; In re Camille,
supra, note i; In re Knight, 171 Fed. 299 (19o9); Felix v. State, i8 Ala. 720
(I851), where a person having one-half negro blood was held not to be a negro.
See in this connection, U. S. v. Saunders, Fed. Cas. No. I6, 220 (1847), holding
that the status of an Indian half breed is determined by that of its mother, and
6
1n
7
1n
8

Ex Parte Reynolds, Fed. Cas. No. II, 719 (1879), where the status of such a

person was held to be determined by that of the father.
'Such statutes are chiefly those forbidding certain kinds of testimony against
white persons, those forbidding marriage between negroes and whites, those
confining the right to vote to white persons, and those providing separate schools
for white persons. It should be borne in mind that the interpretation of such
statutes depends to a large extent on the purpose with which they were passed.
As an example of the extent to which a court will go in following the allegedintent
of the framers of such statutes see People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (854), where a
Chinaman was held to be within a statute forbidding any "Black or Mulatto
person, or Indian" from testifying against a white man.
The modem "Jim Crow" laws are of little value in this connection since they
are directed against "colored persons." This term is not a racial distinction.
It refers to those having any appreciable taint of negro blood. See State v.
Treadway, 126 La. 3oo (I9IO).
"Jeffries v. Ankeny, ii Oh. 372 (1842); Lane v. Baker, 12 Oh. 237 (1843);
Monroe v. Collins, 17 Oh. St. 665 (1867).
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of the slave period meant without any colored blood. 14 The general
distinction, however, seems to be that if one has more than onefourth non-white blood he is not "white."' 5 If he has less than onefourth non-white blood he is "white."'"
As for quarter-bloods themselves, they are seemingly not "white."' 7 As the reasons that lead the
courts to draw the color line where they do in statutes such as these' s
would seem to apply with much force to the naturalization statute,
one cannot be far wrong in presupposing that the courts will follow
the line of cases suggested when the question of the naturalization
of those of mixed blood finally arises.' 9
L. I. Shelley, '17.
Domestic Relations: Effect of Removal of Disability upon Matrimonial Conduct.-The question of the creation of a true marital
status after removal of a disability which has made the previous
matrimonial conduct illicit has recently arisen in two cases, Smith v.
Reed, 89 S. E. (Ga.) 815 (1916), and In re Biersack, 159 N. Y. Supp.
5-9 (.9x6). In the former case the applicant was the daughter of
Ellen Jones and William Williams, who were married in Wales in
1859. Williams came to this country and was followed by his wife
and daughter in 1863. He left his wife and daughter in New York
in 1865 and went away. In 1871 he married a widow in Georgia
who did not know that Williams had another wife living. The
defendant, born before the death of first wife, was the child of this
second marriage. The first wife died in i8go and Williams and the
widow he married continued to live together until the death of the
latter in 19o7. Williams died in 1911.

The question concerned the

legitimacy of the defendant and this depended upon whether there
was a valid marriage between Williams and the widow.
Counsel for the applicant contended that, if Williams had a living
wife when he entered into a ceremonial marriage with the mother of
the defendant, the attempted marriage was void and his living with
her was an illicit relation and so continued even after the death of
"4Du Val v. Johnson, 39 Ark. 182 (1882). This dictum seems to be without
foundation in any adjudicated case.
5Walker v. Brockway, i Mich. N. P. 57 (1869); Van Camp v.Board of Education, 9 Oh. St. 406 (1859); Jones v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. 538 (1885).
16Bailey v. Fiske, 34 Me. 7 (1852); People v. Dean, 14 Mich. 406 (1866);
Williams v. School District, Wiight (Oh.) 578 (1834); Thacker v. Hawk, ii Oh.
376 (1842); Anderson v. Iillikin, 9 Oh. St. 568 (1859); McPherson v. Commonwealth, 28 Gratt. (Va.) 939 (1877).
27Jones v. Commonwealth, supra,note 15; Walker v. Brockway, supra,note 15;
semble, Johnson v. Norwich, 29 Conn. 407 (1890); contra, Gray v. State, 4 Oh.
353.
"8See note 12. A feeling that the non-white races are inferior is the basis both
of these discriminatory statutes, and of the racial test in the naturalization law.
If a certain proportion of white blood is sufficient to give one of mixed blood the
status of the superior race under these statutes, that proportion should be sufficient to make an alien desirable as a citizen.
"But note that in the cases cited the white strain was the white American
strain descended from the supposedly pure European stock. Would this reasoning hold if the white strain was the admittedly impure and mixed Asiatic stock?
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the first wife and until a formal ceremony of marriage should be
performed after that event. The court affirmed the judgment of the
lower court, based upon a charge tothe jurythat if Williams continued
to live with defendant's mother after the death of the first wife, the
second marriage was valid.
The decision seems to accord with the better view but there is
some conflict of authority on the subject. Where a person marries,
having a husband or wife living, it is everywhere held that the
marriage is absolutely void. But if the parties continue their
matrimonial conduct after the removal of the impediment there is
a difference of opinion as to the effect that such removal has on the
matrimonial conduct as evidence of a valid marriage. With respect
to the good faith of the parties the cases may be grouped into three
classes.
The first class consists of those cases where the matrimonial
conduct of the parties entering into a marriage contract while under
an impediment was known to both parties to be illicit. Here it is
generally held that a new contract of marriage must be shown after
removal of the impediment,' although the English and New York
views seem to be to the contrary.2 In the second class of cases
both parties desire marriage and contract in good faith, neither
knowing of the existence of the impediment. In such a case lawful
marriage will, in all jurisdictions, be presumed at once upon removal
of the impediment.3
The conflict arises in the third class where one party knows of the
impediment but conceals it from the other who, in good faith, enters
into the marital relations with him under a void marriage. The
principal case comes within this class.
One line of cases holds that marriage is presumed from the time
of the removal of the impediment, if cohabitation continues, 4 while
other jurisdictions require proof of facts to support a presumption
of a new marriage. A leading case supporting the latter view is
Collins v. Voorhees.6 The essential facts in that case are practically
'White v. White, 82 Cal. 427 (i89o); Rose v. Rose, 67 Mich. 619 (1888);
Clark v. Barney, 103 Pac. (Okla.) 598 (1909).
'Geiger v. Ryan, 123 App. Div. (N. Y.) 722 (1908); In re Biersack, 96 Misc.
161 (1916); Campbell v. Campbell, L. R. 2 H. L. 269 (1867).
3Robinson v. Ruprecht, 191 Ill. 424 (1901); Manning v. Spurch, 199 Ill. 447
Il. 288 (1903); Teter v. Teter, 88 Ind. 494 (1883);
Schuchart v. Schuchart, 6r Kans. 597 (1907); Lufkin v. Lufkin, 182 Mass. 476
(1903); Baton v. Eaton, 66 Neb. 676 (1902); Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 68
N.4 J. Eq. 736 (1904).
(1902); Land v. Land, 2o6

Stein v. Stein, 66 Ill. App. 526 (1896); Blanchard v. Lambert, 43 Iowa 228
(1876); Donnelly v. Donnelly, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 113 (1847); Busch v. Supreme
Tent, 8i Mo. App. 562 (1899); Townsend v. Van Buskirk, 33 Misc. (N. Y.) 287
(I9OO); In re Wells, 123 App. Div. (N. Y.) 79 (1908); In re Terwilliger's Estate,
63 Misc. (N. Y.) 479 (i909); Adger v. Ackerman, 115 Fed. 124 (1902); De Thoren
v. Att'y General, L. R. i App. Cas. 686 (1876).
5Cartwright v. McGown, 121 Ill. 388 (1887); Randlett v. Rice, 141 Mass.
385 (z886) ; Howland v. Burlington, 53 Me. 54 (1865); Voorhees v. Voorhees,
46 N. J. Eq. 411 (1890); Collins v. Voorhees, 47 N. J. Eq. 315 (i89o); Hunt's
Appeal; 86 Pa. St. 294 (1874); Severa v. Beranak, 138 Wisc. 144 (r909).
647 N. J. Eq. 555 (I89O) (see dissenting opinion of Garrison, J., id, 315).
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identical with those of the principal case, except that the impediment
was removed by divorce instead of by death. The court held that
the subsequent cohabitation of the parties and their reputation as
husband and wife must necessarily be understood as having had ther
origin in the first marriage and could not be treated as presumptive
evidence of a second marriage at a later date. In a strong dissenting
opinion, Garrison, J., contended that on grounds of public policy
"all matrimonial conduct shall, if possible, be referred to a matrimonial status. If at the time of the commencement of matrimonial
conduct and reputation, there is impediment to the application of
this doctrine, the rule of public policy is not thereby defeated; it
remains in abeyance to be imposed at the first moment when conduct
and capacity shall so co-exist as to render it possible." It would
seem that this is the better view, as it should be inferred that the
matrimonial consent was interchanged as soon as the parties were
enabled by the removal of the impediment to enter into the contract.7
Bishop expresses this doctrine in the following language: "If the
parties desire marriage, and do what they can to render their union
matrimonial, yet one of them is under a disability-as where there
is a prior marriage undissolved-their cohabitation, thus matrimonally meant, will in matter of law make them husband and wife
from the moment when the disability is removed, and it is immaterial
whether they knew of its existence or its removal, or not, nor is
this a question of evidence." 8
A few cases have held the husband estopped to deny his marriage
with one who becomes his wife in good faith, if cohabitation has
continued after the impediment has been removed. 9 This doctrine
has received scant attention from the courts, as it seems preferable to
decide the question on the ground of the creation of a true marital
status after removal of the disability.
In In re Biersack, supra,the plaintiff, Louise Biersack, married one
Bachman in 1902. Six days later he deserted her and believing him
dead she entered into a common law marriage with one Kruse in
1904. At that time common law marriages were invalid in New York,
but the statute was amended in 1907, the effect of which made common law marriages valid after January i, 19o8.10

A child was born

in 1907. The plaintiff and Kruse lived together as husband and wife
after the removal of the legal impediment. The court held that from
that time they were husband and wife and that such subsequent
marriage legitimated the child. The decision is in accord with the
New York law that marriage is presumed from the time of the removal
of the impediment."
7Campbell v. Campbell, note 2, supra; De Thoren v. Att'y General, note 4,
supra.
8I Bishop, Marriage and Divorce, sec. 970.
Purcell v. Purcell, 4 Hen. & Munf. (Va.) 507 (I8io).
10I CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 48.
UNorth v. North, i Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 241 (1842); Geiger v. Ryan, 123 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 722 (19o8); Rose v. Clark, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 574 (1841); see also
New York cases cited in note 4, supra.
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The first case in the New York reports is Fenton v. Reed.Y There
the plaintiff was the lawful wife of one Guest in 1785. Then Guest
left the state and remained away until 1792, when it was reported
that he died abroad. Plaintiff married Reed in 1792 and in the same
year Guest returned to this country, where he remained until his
death in 18oo. Plaintiff continued to cohabit with Reed until i8o6
when he died. No marriage took place between plaintiff and Reed
after the death of Guest, the only evidence of marital purpose being
that which might be derived from the continuance of their former
conduct. The court held that there was strong evidence from which
marriage might be presumed. In New York it has been consistently
held that parties who enter into a marital relation under a disability
become husband and wife as soon as the disability is removed,
if cohabitation continues;" 4even though the first union was known
to both parties to be illicit.'

Harvey I. Tutchings, 'x8.
Libel and Slander: Recovery of Punitive Damages.-The question
as to when punitive damages or smart money are allowed in actions
for libel and slander is raised and the law thereon summarized in
Tim v. 'Hawes, i6o N. Y. Supp. xo96 (1916), decided recently by
the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court in the first department.
The defendant in speaking of the plaintiff, a lawyer, said, "He does
not practice law because he has been disbarred." It appears that
the relations between the parties had always been pleasant and that
the words were spoken thoughtlessly, with a mere lack of ordinary
prudence. The court sustained an exception to a charge that if
the words were spoken in a wanton or reckless manner in disregard
of the plaintiff's character and reputation in the community, and
without proper regard for his rights, they might award punitive
damages, on the ground that the trial justice failed to submit the
question of malice to the jury and that there was an insufficient
explanation as to what the basis for awarding punitive damages was.
Mr. Justice Shearn, speaking for the Appellate Term said: "The
basis of punitive damages is actual malice. Actual malice cannot
be presumed but must be proved as a fact in the case by a preponderance of the credible evidence. Actual malice may be established
as follows: (i) By proving actual ill will. In addition to the
ordinary methods of proving ill will, /he words complained of may
of themselves afford the proof when, f~r example, an attack is couched
in such venomous language and so plainly exhibits hatred as to
warrant an inference of actual ill will. (2) By proving such gross
negligence and carelessness as indicates a wanton disregard of the
rights of others. (3) When the words complained of are proved as a
fact to be false, if they are of a heinous, atrocious or extreme character, that, too, is evidence of actual malice."
124 Johns. (N:Y.) 52 (1809).

"See note i1., supra; In re Schmidt, 42 Misc. (N. Y.) 463 (1903); In re Wells,

r23 App. Div. (N. Y.) 79 (1908).
"Geiger v. Ryan, 123 App. Div. (N. Y.) 722 (19o8).
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The fiction that malice is essential to every action for libel has
long since been exploded. It is settled in New York,' at least, that
proof of malice is not necessary for the recovery of actual damages
except where the libel is privileged. Where an article is published
which is libelous per se, malice is conclusively presumed to exist
for the purpose of awarding compensation. However, where the
injured party seeks to recover exemplary or punitive damages,
that is, a sum in addition to that necessary to make him whole, as
a balm for his injured feelings; as a punishment to the guilty party and
to deter others from offending in a similar manner, the malice implied
by law drops out of sight and the burden is upon the party asking
such damages to prove malice by competent evidence. 2 "The term
'malice' in its broad sense imports that state of mind or feeling
which prompts an individual to do an act whereby another is or may
be injured wrongfully and intentionally, without just cause or
excuse

*

*

*

* '3

The law as to the kind of malice sufficient to justify smart money
has been brought into serious confusion by the varied and loose4
expressions of the courts. As remarked by Mr. Justice Gaynor:
"The jumble in some modem textbooks on slander and libel concerning malice, actual malice, malice in law, malice in fact, implied
malice and express malice (all derived from judicial utterances,
it is true) is a striking testimony of the limitations of the human
mind." While all courts are agreed as to the necessity of malice
as a basis for awarding exemplary damages, in some states5 it is
held that express malice must be shown, while in others6 implied
malice is considered sufficient. Implied malice in an action for libel
has been defined as a "presumption drawn by the law from the simple
fact of publication." '7 That malice is sufficient for the award of
compensatory damages. It results from the unjustified publication
of matter tending to injure the character of another. Express malice,
it is said, "consists in a libelous publication from ill will or some
wrongful motive, implying a willingness to injure in addition to the
intent to do the unlawful act." There is some authority to the
'Ullrich v. N. Y. Press Co., 23 Misc. (N. Y.) 168 (1898); Cady v. Brooklyn
Union Pub. Co., 23 Misc. (N. Y.) 409 (1898).
2Brandt v. Morning Journal Association, 8i App. Div. (N. Y.) 183 (1903);
Carpenter v. N. Y. Evening Journal Pub. Co., i r App. Div. (N. Y.) 266 (i9o6).
Brandt v. Morning Journal Association, supra, note 2.
'Ullrich v. N. Y. Press Co., supra,note i; an example of such loose expressions
may be found in Lewis v. Chapman, I6 N. Y. 369, 372 (1857) which case is
criticised
in Schuyler v. Busby, 68 Hun (N. Y.) 474, 478 (1893).
5
Murrayv. Galbraith, 95Ark. I99 (191o); Davisv. Hearst, i6o Cal. 143 (1911);
Donahoe v. Star Co., 4 Pennewill (Del.) 166 (1903); Wash. Herald Co. v. Berry,
41 App. D. C. 322 (914); Astruc. v. Star Co., 182 Fed. 705 (igio); DePewv.
Robinson, 95 Ind. *o9 (1884); Garvin v. Garvin, 87 Kan. 97 (1912); Eviston
v. 6Cramer, 57 Wis. 570 (1883).

Beeson v. H. W. Gossard Co., 167 Ill. App. 56i (1912); Reid v. Sun Pub. Co.,
I58 Ky. 727 (914); Shockey v. McCauley, ioi Md. 461 (i9o5); Arnold v.
Savings Co., 76 Mo. App. 159 (1897); Ellis v. Garrison, 174 S.W. (Tex.) 962
(915).
7

Krug v. Pitass, 162 N. Y. 54 (900).

8

Krug v. Pitass, supra, note 7.
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effect that these terms do not adequately express the distinction
between the malice necessary for the award of compensatory and
punitive damages.' The true distinction is that for the award of
the former, malice will be presumed, while to recover the latter,
malice must be established by evidence.
Cohalan v. New York Press Company, the latest opinion of the
New York Court of Appeals on the question, lays down the rule that
"the plaintiff must establish the fact of actual malice and must
do so by a fair preponderance of evidence," in order to justify an
award beyond mere compensation. The leading case upon the
subject in New York is Samuels v. Evening Mail Association." That
case decided that proof of the falsity of the libel was evidence of
malice sufficient to warrant a recovery of exemplary damages in the
sound discretion of the jury. If the defendant gave evidence tending
to show that there was in fact no actual malice, the question was not
to be withdrawn from the jury but they were to consider whether .the
malice was of such a character as to entitle the plaintiff to exemplary
damages. The Samuels case stands for the proposition that upon
proof of the falsity of the libel, the jury are justified in inferring express
malice from the publication. The theory under which this express
malice is worked out appears in a recent case2 where it is stated
that the malice referred to in the language apparently is legal malice,
but that if this legal malice is of such a character as to constitute
actual malice, exemplary damages may be awarded. There is no
presumption of malice in the sense that a legal significance is attached
to certain evidentiary facts of a probative value. The falsity of the
libel must appear from all the evidence in the case. There must be
proof of the falsity of the libel, of its character and of the circumstances surrounding its publication before express malice
may be inferred which will entitle the plaintiff -to punitive
damages.13 Since in actions for defamation there is no fixed measure
of damages, the amount of recovery rests with the jury alone, with a
duty in the court to set it aside where the verdict appears passionate,
perverse, partial or corrupt. 14 Thus, where the jury were improperly
9

Brandt v. Morning Journal Association, supra, note 2.
N. Y. 344 (1914); see also Carpenter v. N. Y. Evening Journal Pub. Co.,
supra, note 2.
"9 Hun (N. Y.) 288 (1876). The dissenting opinion of Davis, 3., in the Supreme
Court was adopted as the majority view in 75 N. Y. 6o4 (1878). This decision
has been approved in the following cases: Warner v. Press Pub. Co., 132 N. Y.
i81, I84 (1892); Crane v. Bennett, 177 N. Y. IO6 (I904); and the cases cited
supra, note 2; but see contra, Krug v. Pitass, supra, note 7. The latter decision
does not mention the Samuels case and is therefore not regarded as overruling
it. The Crane case, supra, regards the decision in the King case as correct on
its facts but says that it is not to be extended and that broad statements made
by the court which are contrary to the prevailing doctrine are to be treated as
dicta.
nBresslin v. Star Co., 166 App. Div. (N. Y.) 89 (1915); see also Houston
Chron. Co. v. Quinn, 184 S. W. (Tex.) 669 (I916), where recovery was worked
out upon an analogous theory.
"Crane
v. Bennett, supra, note ii.
' 4Shute v. Barrett, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 81, 84 (1828); Wadsworth v. Treat, 43
Me. 163, 166 (1857); Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 44, 52 (1812).
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instructed on the question of exemplary damages, such error was
held vital to the verdict, it not being within the power of the court
to know what portion of the damages awarded constituted compensation and what punitive damages, and the verdict was accordingly
set aside. 15
What are the elements of actual malice? Such malice, according
to the authorities,16 may be shown b~r evidence of (i) personal ill
will, or (2) wanton or reckless conduct in the publication or (3)
the use of words which, being false, are of such a character as to
establish a degree of wrongdoing calling for punishment. Let us
suppose the following situation: A, the publisher of a newspaper,
is interested in the B Insurance Company. In order to harm D, a
director of the C InsurancelCompany, against whom A has a personal
grudge, an article is published imputing to D disgraceful and immoral
complicity in an insurance swindle and charging him with culpable
if not criminal misconduct in the management of the business.
That would constitute evidence of personal ill will and it would seem
that ill will might be imputed from the accusation of criminal misbehavior alone. As to the second class of evidence it has been held,7
where a publisher of a weekly paper, before publishing a libel,
circulated about the plaintiff's neighborhood a "dodger" calling
attention to the forthcoming article, that the jury was warranted
in finding recklessness and carelessness sufficient to justify an award
of punitive damages, in the absence of evidence showing inquiry
before publication. Illustrations of the third form which actual
malice may take would be inappropriate here and are easily imagined.
Whether the words used must be heinous, atrocious or extreme in
character in order to establish the degree of wrongdoing calling for
punishment is conjectural. The principal case appears to correctly
state the law as previously laid down in New York.
On principle the question may be viewed from two angles. Taking
into consideration the sensationalism of the modem press and the
increased tendency to overstep the proper limits in publication,
it would seem that in actions for libel implied malice might well be
held sufficient for the recovery of punitive damages. Such a rule,
by making recovery easier, would doubtless induce greater care on
the part of our publishers. On the other hand, if the view be taken
that the doctrine of exemplary damages is really an anomaly, "a sort
of hybrid between a display of ethical indignation and the imposition
of a criminal fine,' 8 it would seem that a strict rule of recovery
requiring proof of express malice should be followed. The guilty
party in addition to civil liability exposes himself to criminal prosecution and before inflicting the double punishment adequate evidence
of actual malice should be given. The latter would seem to be the
better view.
Leonard G. Aierstok, 'z7.
"5Cohalan v. N. Y. Press Co., supra, note Io; Armory v. Vreeland, 125 App.
Div.
(N. Y.) 850 (19o8).
l 6Armory v. Vreeland, supra, note i and the cases cited therein. See also
Newell
on Slander and Libel, p. 1020.
lTYoung v. Fox, 26 App. Div. (N. Y.) 261 (1898), aff'd, 155 N. Y. 615 (1898).
IsHaines v. Schultz, 50 N. J. L. 481 (x888).
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Master and Servant: Workmen's Compensation: Admissibility
of Hearsay Evidence in Proceedings before Workmen's Compensation
Board: Findings Based on Hearsay Only.-The effect of section 68
of the Workmen's Compensation Law of New York' in regard to
hearsay evidence is the subject of controversy in the Matter of
Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 435 (1916). This case
was an appeal from an order affirming the decision and award of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission for compensation for the
death of the claimant's husband, which was occasioned, as it is
alleged, by injuries received while he was in the employ of the defendant company as a driver of one of its ice wagons. The commission
made certain findings of fact upon which it based its award. One
of these findings was that the death was caused by the slipping of
the decedent's ice tongs which caused a cake of ice to fall, striking
him in the abdomen. Nobody saw the accident. Three witnesses
testified that they were present at the time and place when, it was
alleged, the decedent was injured, and that they saw no accident
and no cake of ice fall. The finding of the commission was based
solely upon the testimony of witnesses who related what Carroll
told them as to how h9 was injured. The question was thus squarely
raised whether hearsay evidence is admissible in proceedings before
the Workmen's Compensation Commission and, if admissible,
whether the commission is justified in basing a finding entirely upon
such testimony.
It was held in the Appellate Division,2 in the third department,
by a divided court that section 68 wholly abrogated the substantive
law of evidence in such proceedings and that the commission had
power to receive the hearsay evidence and base its findings upon it.
This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals in the principal
case, Seabury, J., and Pound, J., dissenting. The prevailing opinion
per Cuddeback, J., held that, while section 68 admits such hearsay
evidence and allows the commission to hear it, and removes the limits
of admissibility set by the common law and statutory rules of evidence,
yet in the end there must be a residuum of legal evidence to support
the claim before an award can be made; that there must be in the
record "some evidence of a sound, competent and recognizedly
probative character to sustain the findings and award made." Seabury, J., dissented, stating that "The distinction sought to be made
between admitting such evidence and basing an award upon it
seems to me to be unreasonable and not to find support in anything
contained in section 68." Pound, J., dissented on the ground that
the evidence here was admissible and legal and was of probative
'Section 68 of the Workmen's Compensation Law reads as follows:
"Section 68. Technical rules of evidence or procedure not required. The
commission or a commissioner or deputy commissioner in making an investigation
or inquiry or conducting a hearing shall not be bound by common law or statutory
rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of procedure, except as provided
in this chapter; but may make such investigation or inquiry or conduct such
hearing in such manner as to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties."
'Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 169 App. Div. (N. Y.) 450 (1915).
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force and, as such, its weight was for the commission as triers of
fact, their decision thereon being final.
In the absence of any such statute as section 68 it must be admitted
as settled that such evidence is not admissible.' However, it is
conceded by all the judges of the Court of Appeals that such evidence
is admissible in proceedings before the Workmen's Compensation
Commission, but the effect of such evidence unsupported by any
other evidence is where the division occurs.
Just what is meant by the prevailing opinion is somewhat difficult
to interpret. It says that the evidence is admissible but that in
the end there must be a residuum of legal evidence. For what purpose, then, is the hearsay to be introduced? If it is to be admitted
merely to bolster up other evidence, what in addition to the hearsay
is necessary that there may be sufficient evidence upon which to
base a finding? The court attempts to answer this question by
quoting from Mr. Justice Woodward's dissenting opinion in the
court below: "There must be in the record some evidence of a sound,
competent and recognizedly probative character to sustain the
findings and award made, else the findings and award must in fairness
be set aside by the court." This, however, does not answer the
question directly. Must this "residuum" be direct evidence?
If so, then the admission of the hearsay is of no value and unnecessary.
If, on the other hand, all that the "residuum" must be is circumstantial evidence, then it would seem that the hearsay is being
recognized as having probative character, since it may be necessay
in connection with other circumstantial evidence to sustain the
finding. If, therefore, it is recognized as being of a sound, probative
character and is competent, it comes within the definition of the
court as to what the "residuum" must be.
It would seem, furthermore, that in the prevailing opinion no
distinction is made between hearsay admissible at common law,
such as dying declarations, and hearsay which is inadmissible at
common law. The question remains whether hearsay of any kind
would be sufficient to make up the "residuum." If hearsay evidence
admissible at common law be sufficient to form the "residuum" in
any case, the division line between what is and what is not a legal
"residuum" is not between the hearsay evidence as a whole and other
kinds of evidence, but must be made in the field of hearsay evidence
itself. The Court of Appeals, in spite of section 68, seems to retain
the dividing line at just the place it was before the section was passed,
interpreting that section to affect admissibility only. In view of that
section should not the dividing line now be drawn elsewhere?
It will hardly be admitted that all hearsay is of a probative character. Some is unquestionably without any possibilities of probative
character, while on the other hand there are a great many exceptions
to the common law hearsay rule. Just where the line is to be drawn
is a problem and it is submitted that whether or not such hearsay
testimony should be enough to sustain a finding of fact by the com3

See Reck -r.
Whittlesberger, 181 Mich. 463 (1914), and note thereto in Ann.

Cas., 1916 C 775.
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mission should be determined by the character of the evidence
introduced. It is the writer's opinion that section 68 intends that
some kinds of hearsay evidence barred at common law and having
possibilities of probative character should be sufficient to sustain a
finding but that other kinds, having no possibilities of probative
force, should not be sufficient.
In the principal case the evidence upon which the finding was based
4
was such as is admissible in the law courts of Massachusetts. It
is recognized in Massachusetts as being legal evidence fit to go to a
jury. Such evidence is recognized as an exception to the hearsay
rule also in the federal courts.5 In the light of these decisions it
would certainly seem that the evidence here submitted had possibilities of probative force and as such should have been deemed sufficient
to sustain the finding and award.
F. B. Ingersoll, '17 .
Public Service Commission: How Farthe Orders of the Commission
are Reviewable on its Findings of Fact.-Inthe People ex rel. N. Y. &
Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 219 N. Y. 84 (ii6), the Court of Appeals
has finally established the status of the Public Service Commission
in so far as its orders on its findings of fact are reviewable by the
courts. The Public Service Commission Law' gives the commission
authority to order gas companies to make reasonable improvements
and extensions. Under this statute the commission ordered the
relator to extend its gas mains and services to supply with gas an
outlying district of the city. The Appellate Division set aside the
order as unreasonable, but the Court of Appeals in overruling this
decree held that the lower court did not "have the power to determine
that the extension * * * was unreasonable in the sense that itwas

an unwise or inexpedient order, but only that it was unreasonable
if it was an unlawful, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power."
This decision establishes a basis for reviewing the orders of the
commission on its findings of fact entirely different from that often
practised by the courts. Formerly the court under certiorari proceedings would go into the facts of the particular case and if the
evidence preponderated against the determination made by the
commission, the court would nullify the order as unreasonable.
In other words it virtually substituted its own judgment for that
of the commission by declaring the order unreasonable because
it
2
would not, upon the same facts, have made a similar order.
'Sylvester v. N. Y., N. H., and H. R. Co., 217 Mass. 148 (1914); in proceedings before Workmen's Compensation Comm., Pigeon's Case, 216 Mass. 51
(I913)

and note thereto in Ann. Cas., 1915 A 737.

'Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 75 U. S. 397 (1869).
'Public Service Commission Law (Consolidated Laws, I9IO, chapter 48),
section
66.
2
People ex rel. B. H. R. R. v. Public Service Commission, 157 App. Div. (N. Y.)
698 (913); and see People ex rel. Steward v. R. R. Commission, i6o N. Y. 202
(1899).
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But in the principal case the Court of Appeals has begun to follow
the rule laid down by the United States Supreme Court in its review
of the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, which
seems more in accord with sound legal reasoning and with the usefulness of the commission for all practical purposes. The federal
courts hold that findings of fact made within the scope of the administrative functions of the commission are not susceptible of judicial
review. But the courts do have the power to pass upon the orders
of the commission when such orders are violative of the constitution,
when the statutory powers conferred upon the commission have been
exercised in such an arbitrary manner as to virtually transcend
the authority conferred, although they may not technically appear
to do so.3 The court confines itself to the ultimate question of
whether the commission has acted within its power. The court
will not consider the wisdom or expediency of the order or even
whether on4 the same testimony it would have reached the same
conclusion.
No court has yet undertaken to lay down a rule which shall furnish
a test of what is reasonable that will fit every case. And it seems
that the law which ought to govern the review of the orders of the
commission and which the principal base follows is best expressed
by the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Great Northern Ry. Co.5
where the court says: "The order may be vacated as unreasonable
if it is contrary to some provision of the federal or state constitution
or laws, or if it is beyond the power granted to the Commission, or if
it is based on some mistake of law, or if there is no evidence to support
it, or if, having regard to the interests of both the public and the
carrier, it is so contrary as to be beyond the exercise of a reasonable
discretion and judgment."
Charles Abramson, '17.
Real Property: Adverse Possession: Property Subject thereto:
Public Highways.-In Board of Supervisors v. Norfolk & Western Ry.
Co., 89 S. E. Adv. Sheets (Va.) 95. (i96), the plaintiffs brought a
suit in equity to compel the defendant railroad to change its
approaches to a bridge to the same width as the old road and to
make easy grades, or to restore the old highway as it had previously
existed. Among the defenses interposed by the railroad company
was the one that the plaintiff supervisors were barred from their
action by lapse of time and laches. The court held this plea untenable, adopting the rule of N. & W. Ry. Co. v. Supervisors of Carroll
County.' The rule there statedF is: "Public Highways belong to
3U. S.v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. R., 234 U. S. 476 (I913); Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central R. R., 215 U. S. 452 (1909); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. R., 222 U. S. 541 (191).
4Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. P., supra, note 3;
Baltimore & Ohio PL R. Co. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U. S. 481 (i9io); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central IL R., supra, note 3.
rState v. Great Northern R. PL Co., 153 N. W. (Minn.) 247 (1915).

1IIO Va. 9s (i9o9).

2At pages IO2 and io3.

THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
the state, and the statute of limitations does not run against the
rights of the public therein, nor does the doctrine of laches apply.
As against the government, laches cannot be set up as a defense in
equity any more than the bar of the statute can at law. Time does
not run against the state, nor bar the rights of the public."
It has been widely recognized that there in a conflict of the authorities as to whether the doctrine of adverse possession applies to
municipal corporations, i.e., towns and counties having charge of
the public highways.3 Where the conflict has been recognized there
is also diversity of opinion as to which way the weight of adjudications
tend. Some of the writers who have examined the authorities claim
that the majority are in favor of allowing the statute of limitations
to run against the public as against an individual, while others claim
the opposite. Many jurisdictions4 have in recent years changed
the rulings previously made on this question, and the decisions at
the present time will probably show that the greater number are
inclined to favor the rule
as adopted in Board of Supervisors v. Norfolk
5
and W. Ry. Co., supra.
The courts which favor the rule that public highways shall not be
subject to adverse possession have taken considerable pains to give
the reasons upon which they have based their decisions. Probably
the most common reason why the statute of limitations should not
apply as a bar to the rights of the public in highways is that the same
active vigilance cannot be expected of the public as is known to
characterize that of a private person, always jealous of his rights
3I

Cyc. 878;

i

R. C. L. 736;

2

Corpus Juris

72;

Meyer v. City of Lincoln, 33

Neb.
566 (189i) at page 570.
4

Notably Iowa, Ohio, and Virginia.
The following jurisdictions hold in accord with Board of Supervisors v. Norfolk
and W. Ry. Co., infra; Ham v. Dadeville, IOO Ala. 199 (1893); Red
Bluff v. Wallridge, 15 Cal. App. 770 (1911); Allender v. Wilmington, 7 Pen.
(Del.) 48 (19o6); Langley v. Augusta, i18 Ga. 590 (19o3); Thiessen v. City of
Lewiston, 26 Idaho 505 (1914); Close v. Chicago, 257 Ill. 47 (1912); Hall v.
Breyfogle, 162 Ind. 494 (1903); Quinn v. Baage, 138 Iowa 426 (19o8); Wallace v.
Cable, 87 Kans. 835 (1912); Zagame v. New Orleans, 128 La. 388 (I9ii); Lexington v. Hoskins, 96 Miss. 163 (19o9); Columbia v. Bright, 179 Mo. 441 (1903);
5

Lydick v. State, 61 Neb. 309 (19O1); Harrington v. Manchester, 76 N. H. 347
(1912); Board of Freeholders v. Sharpless, 83 N. J. L. 443 (1912); Driggs v.
Phillips, 103 N. Y. 77 (1886); New Bern v. Wadsworth, 151 N. C. 309 (19o9);

Heddleston v. Hendricks, 52 Ohio St. 46o (1895); Barton v. Portland, 74 Ore.
75 (1914); Commonwealth v. Moorehead, 18 Pa. St. 344 (1888); Horgan v.
Jamestown,

32

R. 1. 528 (1911); Crocker v. Collins, 37 S. C. 327 (1892); Raht v.

Southern Ry. Co., 5o S. W. (Tenn.) 72 (1897); Spencer v. Levy, 173 S. W. (Tex).
550 (1915); Hague v. Mill & Elevator Co., 37 Utah 290 (1910); Supervisors v.
N. & W. Ry. Co., 89 S. E. Adv. Sheets (Va.) 951 (1916); Rapp v. Stratton, 41 Wash.
263 (1905); Clifton v. Town of Weston, 54 W. Va.
Davis, 91 Wis. 370 (1895).

250

(I9O3); and Nicolaiv.

The following jurisdictions hold contrato Board of Supervisors v. Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co., infra: El Dorado v. Ritchie Grocery Co., 84 Ark. 52 (1907); Derby v.
Alling, 40 Conn. 410 (1873); District of Columbia v. Krause, ii App. D. C. 398
(1897); Laundry Co. v. Louisville, 168 Ky. 499 (1916); Kelly v. Jones, I io Me.
36o (1913); Winslow v. Nayson, 113 Mass. 411 (1873); Vier v. Detroit, iii Mch..
646 (1897); New Haramon v. Krause, 93 Minn. 455 (1904); and Knight vi
Heaton, 22 Vt. 480 (I850).
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and prompt to repel any invasion of them. 6 Each individual feels
but a slight interest in public rights of property and rather tolerates7
even a manifest encroachment, than seeks a dispute to set it right.
This is based upon the old English maxim, nullum tempus occurrit
regi, which is held to apply to the commonwealth in some states as it
does in England to the Crown.8 It is argued 9 that only when the
state lays aside its sovereignty and places itself in the position of a
contracting party, a natural person, may the state be subjected
to the provisions of the statute of limitations. Then it is also said 0
that the state is not the sovereign in this country, but the people
who make it are sovereign, and the highways are the only property
that the people of the state hold in their sovereign capacity. Therefore, since the officers of a state, county, or city are but" servants
of the people, the statute of limitations which is made to apply to
the corporation does not apply to the people or their public rights.
It furthermore seems logical to assume that, since a municipal
corporation has no power to sell or alienate highways (simply holding
them in trust for the public)," adverse possession or a highway for
the length of time required by statute should not afford a legal
presumption that a grant of title to the highway has been made, but
has been lost.1 2

The courts sometimes say that the sound reason for

not allowing the doctrine of adverse possession to apply to highways
rests in the public policy of reserving public rights from injury and
loss by negligence of public officers." A continuing public nuisance
is another ground upon which it is decided that no rights in highways
can be acquired by long continued possession.14 These reasons
against the subjection of highways to adverse possession have been
responsible for the common law maxim, "Once a highway, always a
highway."' 15
Where the rule that public highways shall be subject to adverse
possession has been maintained, the courts have generally not been
careful to assign the particular reasons for their holding. In a leading
Massachusetts case 6 the court said: "We can see no good reason
why the presumption of a lawful origin derived from the continuance
for forty years of an apparent encroachment upon a public way
should not be regarded as a presumption of law, and conclusive in
favor of the possession." No distinction is drawn between municipal
corporations and natural persons in the operation of the statute of
6
Heddleston v. Hendricks, supra, note 5.
7Commonwealth
v. Alburger, i Whart. (Pa.) 468 (1836).
8
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 29 Gratt. (Va.) 780 (1878).
9
Burlington v. B.& M. R. Co., 41 Iowa 134 (1875).
'°Ralston v. Town of Weston, 46W. Va. 544 (1899).
"Alton v. Ili. Transportation Co., 12 111. 38 (185o); Dillon, Municipal Corporations (3d ed.), sec. 675.
1Crocker v. Collins, supra, note 5.
"Forsyth v. City of Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 318 (1882).
"Rung v. Shoneberger, 2 Watts (Pa.) 23 (18,3).
"5Wolfe v. Town of Sullivan, 133 Ind. 331 (Q893).

"Cutter v. City of Cambridge, 88 Mass.
.supra,note 5.
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(1863); see also Knight v. Heaton,
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limitations. 7 The courts upholding this rule subjecting highways to
adverse possession argue that a town or county has committees or
commissioners whose special duty it is to see that highways are kept
free from encroachments and, if they permit adverse possession for
the statutory period, the town or county ought to lose all right
thereto. 18 It is admitted 9 that the statute of limitations does not
apply to the state or sovereignty, but it is said,20 "The principle
has not been extended to municipal or public corporations." An
early Ohio case,21 often cited by courts allowing adverse possession
to apply to public highways, attempts to answer the sovereignty
argument advanced by courts holding in accord with Board of Supervisors v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., supra. The Ohio court said:2
"Immunity (from application of the statute of limitations) seems to
be an attribute of sovereignty only. No case is found which exempts
any other description of person, whether natural or artificial from
the operations of the law; and none of the reasons for the exemption,
apply with much force to municipal corporations. The law imposes
upon them the duty of defending the interests which they are created
to hold, and has conferred every power necessary to this end. When
their land or franchises are. of public character, the public which they
represent are principally members of their own body, sufficiently
vigilant to watch their own interests, and sufficiently powerful to
defend them." While not openly declaring whether the statute
of limitations does or does not run against the public, it has been
held" that under some circumstances justice demands that the public
be estopped from asserting its rights to a highway against an individual adversely in possession. This doctrine has been contradicted"
on the ground that the statute of limitations is a mere legal estoppel.
The decisions in the class of cases allowing highways to be subject
to adverse possession are, apparently, based on reasons which are
not as convincing as those advanced by courts holding the opposite
view.
It appears, therefore, that on reason the jurisdictions upholding
the rule of Board of Supervisors v. Norfolk 6' Western Ry. Co., supra,
have much the better of jurisdictions holding contra. Furthermore,
the courts holding contrahave in some instances based their decisions
on, or have cited, cases which have since been overruled by later
cases in the same jurisdiction. It is also true that several of the
cases making any attempt to declare sound reasons for allowing
17The
case most often cited is City of Cincinnati v. Evans, 5 Ohio St. 594 (1855).
28Meyer v. City of Lincoln, supra, note 3, citing City of Wheeling v. Campbell,
X2 W. Va. 36 (1877), which has since been disproved in Ralston v. Town of
Weston
supra, note IO.
19
2 0City of Pella v. Schotte, 24 Iowa 283 (1868).
City of Pella v. Schotte, supra, note 19, at page 293.
21
City of Cincinnati v. Presbyterian Church, 8 Ohio 299 (1838). This case as
well as Cincinnati v. Evans, supra, note 17, has since been overruled by Heddleston v. Hendricks, supra, note 6.
"At page 3o.
"Davis
v. Huebner, 45 Iowa 574 (x877).
24Ralston v. Town of Weston, supra, note Io.
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highways to be subject to adverse possession were decided in the
early part of the nineteenth century. The theory upon which the
very early Ohio case based its decision may be more or less correct,
but its practical application would be difficult. Since that time
vast changes have taken place in the economic and political development of the country. The vigilance of city authorities and county
commissioners cannot reasonably be expected to prevent encroachments upon the public highway. The rule of law as adopted in
Board of Supervisors v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. should be universally
H. R. Lamb, '8.
approved.
Real Property: Ownership of Beds of Streams in New York State.The case of Danes v. State of New York, 219 N. Y. 67 (1916), again
raises the interesting question of the ownership of the beds of the
streams of New York, and especially of the Mohawk and Hudson
Rivers. In that case it was held that the bed of the Mohawk River
belongs to the state, and that the owners of the uplands contiguous
to such river, which have been taken for the barge canal, are not
entitled to compensation for the land connected with the uplands
under and to the center of the river.
It is a well recognized rule of law that a state owns the land beneath
the navigable streams within its boundaries. To determine whether
a stream is "navigable", two rules have been advanced, viz., the
common law rule and the civil law rule. The common law rule of
England, as set forth in the celebrated treatise, "De lure Maris,"
by Sir Matthew Hale, and in the leading English case, The Royal
Fisheries of the Banne,l was that a stream in which the tide ebbs and
flows is navigable, and the bed of such stream belongs to the Crown,
while a stream which is not under the influence of the tide is not
navigable, and the riparian owners on each side thereof own the
subject, however, to the public
land to the thread of the stream,
right of navigation thereon.2 Navigability, according to the civil
law, was to be determined by the question of whether the stream 3was
in fact navigable, i.e., navigable in the common sense of the term.
When we look to see which rule has been followed in New York,
we find that the common law rule has been applied to all the streams
within the state, with the exception of the Mohawk River, the Hudson
River above tide water, and the streams forming any portion of the
149 (16io).
2See for full discussion of common law rule, 2 Virginia Law Review 436 (1915);

'Davies' Rep.,

HarvardLaw Review 80 (1913).
3Code Napoleon, sees. 559-561, which provided: "Islands formed in the
bed of streams which are navigable or which admit floats, belong to the nation,
if there is no title or prescription to the contrary. . . . Islands, forming
in rivers and streams not navigable and not admitting floats, belong to the
proprietor of the shore on that side where the island is formed; if the island is
not formed on one side only, it belongs to the proprietors on the shore on the two
sides, divided by an imaginary line drawn through the middle of the river."
27
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boundaries of the state. 4 The courts of the state have applied the
common law rule to the following rivers, holding that the beds
thereof belong to the riparian owners: Battenkill River, 5 Black
River, 6 Cattaraugus Creek,7 Chenango River s Chittenango Creek, 9
Deer River, 0 Genesee River,' Moose River, 2 Onondaga River,"
Oswego River, 14 Racket River, 15 Salmon River," Saranac River. 17
But the title to the bed of Wood Creek (in Washington County),
having been excepted from the lands conveyed by the King of
England by the so-called "Skeeneborough patent," and having been
reserved as "a common highway for the benefit of the public,"
vested in the state upon the formation of our government.'
Some doubt was cast upon the prevalence of the common law rule
by adictumof Senator Beardsley in Ex parte Tibbetts, 9 which declared
that the rule did not apply to our large fresh water streams. When
the same case was again before the court 2 it was stated that the
common law rule, which authorizes the owners of the shores of rivers
in which the tide does not ebb and flow to hold to the thread of the
stream, was not applicable to the condition of this state in respect
to its large rivers, navigable in fact, in which the tide does not ebb
and flow; that the acts of the government, in asserting title to the
beds of rivers after granting the lands upon the shores of such rivers,
raised a strong presumption that the common law rule had never
been adopted in New York; that especially was this true of the
Mohawk River, since the government had claimed the right to and
actually did dispose of the bed and islands of that river notwithIn Varick v. Smith,21 however,

standing previous grants of the shores.

it was said that the Tibbetts case, supra,was restricted to and applicable only to the Mohawk River.
4
Matter of Commissoners of State Reservation, 37 Hun (N. Y.) 537, 547
(1885), holding that the bed of the Niagara River belongs to the state; see also
Strawberry Island Co. v. Cowles, 79 Misc. (N. Y.) 279 (1913), which declared:
"The court will take judicial notice that the Niagara River is a navigable stream

and constitutes an international boundary.

.

.

.

The State of New York

is the owner in fee of the bed of the Niagara River."
5Shaw v. Crawford, io Johns. (N. Y.) 236 (1813).

6Munson v. Hungerford, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 265 (1849).
7Seneca Nation of Indians v. Knight, 23 N. Y. 498 (I86I).
sChenango
Bridge Co. v. Paige, 83 N. Y. 278 (188o).
9
Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cowen (N. Y.) 518 (1826).
0
" Matter of Wilder, 9o App. Div. (N. Y.) 262 (1904).

"Starr v. Child, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 149 (1838); Commissioners of Canal Fund v.
Kei pshall, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 404 (1841); Powell v. City of Rochester, 93 Misc.
(N. Y.) 227 (2926).

"DeCamp v. Thomson, 16 App. Div. (N. Y.) 528 (1897).
Luce v. Carley, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 450 (1840).
' 4Varick v. Smith, 9 Paige (N. Y.) 546 (z842); Fulton L., H., & P. Co. v. State

of New York, 2oo N. Y. 4oo (291I).

"5Morgan v. King, 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 9 (1858).
16Hooker v. Cummings, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 90 (1822).
"7People v. Pellet, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) x95 (1819).
18Johnson v. State of New York, 25i App. Div. (N. Y.) 36r (1912); Whitehall
W. P. Co., Ltd. v. Atlantic ,G. & P. Co., 16o App. Div. (N. Y.) 208 (1914).
19 :Wend. (N. Y.) 423 (1830).
2017

Wend. (N. Y.) 571 (2836).

21Supra, note 14.
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Subsequently, in the leading case of People ex rel. Loomis v. Canal
Appraisers,2 it was expressly held that the Mohawk River is a
navigable stream, the title to the bed of which is in the people of
the state. This decision was placed largely upon the ground that the
legislature, by its course of dealing with the river, had indicated its
understanding that the title to the bed of the river was in the state,
because in 1786 there had been an act authorizing the granting of
lands under the navigable waters of the state, and in 1792 the legislature had granted a portion of the bed of the Mohawk River to the
Western Inland Navigation Company.2 Judge Davies, who wrote
the opinion, also gave as a further ground for the decision the inapplicability of the common law rule to the larger bodies of water and
streams within the state.
A somewhat different theory was advanced in Smith v. City of
Rochester24 as a ground for denying the application of the common
law rule to the Mohawk River and to that portion of the Hudson
River above tide water. The court, per Ruger, J., said, "The titles
granted to the original settlers in the Hudson and Mohawk valleys,
as construed by the rules of the civil law prevailing in the Netherlands, from whose government they were derived, did not convey
to the riparian owners the beds of navigable streams. Upon the
surrender of this territory, the guaranty assured by the English
authorities to its inhabitants of the peaceable enjoyment of their
possessions, simply confirmed the right already possessed, and the
beds of navigable streams, never having been conveyed, became, by
virtue of the right of eminent domain, vested in the English government as ungranted lands, and the State of New York, as a consequence
of the Revolution, succeeded to the rights of the mother country.
As to the lands under these rivers (Mohawk and Hudson), the people
of this state have, from the earliest times, asserted their title, however
acquired, and have assumed to convey and grant them like other
unappropriated lands belonging to the State."
This same theory was adhered to in Fulton L. H., & P. Co. v. State
of New York,2 which recognized the law to be settled that the beds of
the Mohawk and that part of the Hudson above the ebb and flow of
the tide belong to the state. The law was also thus recognized in
Williams v. City of Utica,25 in which the court mentioned both of
the theories above set forth.
Hence, in view of the decisions of the foregoing cases and of the
principal case, it is now well settled that the bed of the Mohawk
River belongs to the state and not to the riparian owners. While
there have been no cases narrowly involving the question of the
2233 N. Y. 461 (1865).
nGreenl. Laws, vol. 3, p. 13.
2492

2

N. Y. 463 (1883).

5Supra, note 14.
The court recognized that the bed of the Mohawk
26217 N. Y. 162 (1916).
River belongs to the state, but held that the plaintiffs had title to the land in
question through an express and direct original grant of the bed of the river from
George the Second. For a similar holding upon a similar state of facts, see Lewis
v. City of Utica, I59 App. Div. (N. Y.) i6o (1913).
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ownership of the bed of the Hudson above tidal influence, the courts
have repeatedly declared that that portion of the Hudson is navigable
and that the bed of the river belongs to the state, and these declarations may be regarded as stating the existing lawY As to that part of
the Hudson where the tide ebbs and flows, it seems immaterial whether
the common law rule or the civil law rule is applied, for under either
rule the state would be held to be the owner of the bed of the river:
under the common law rule because the tide ebbs and flows, and under
the civil law rule because the river is navigable in fact. The common
law2 rule
has been applied, however, in Gould v. Hudson River R. R.
Co., 8 in which it was held that the Hudson River is navigable where
the tide ebbs and flows, and that, as to such part of the river, the bed,
below the ordinary high-water mark, belongs to the state.
Section 26o of the General Business Law29 allows the owners or
lessees of lands bordering on the Hudson River, after compliance
with the conditions of the statute, to cut and harvest the ice formed
in that river between the center thereof and such adjoining .lands."
Since the right to take ice is an incident of the ownership of the bed
of a stream; the legislature, by enacting this statute, must have
regarded the state as the owner of the right to take the ice on the
Hudson and, hence, as the owner of the bed of that river.
Thus we may draw the conclusion that it is the well settled law
in New York that the common law rule of the ownership of beds of
streams applies to all the streams within the state, except the Mohawk
and Hudson, and rivers forming any portion of the boundaries of
the state.
FredS. Reese, Jr., 'r8.
Real Property: Validity of Restraint on Alienation of Fee for a
Limited Time.-In Francisv. Big Sandy Co., 188 S. W. (Ky.) 345
(xpi6), a father and mother conveyed to their son, by deed of gift,
a tract of land, the deed purporting to convey to him a fee simple
title in all respects, but there was the following restriction upon the
right of alienation: "It being understood and agreed that the party
of the second part shall not trade the same to any other person
outside of the party of the first part's bodily heirs for the term of
twenty years." Within this twenty-year period the son sold and
conveyed certain mineral rights in the land to a person not a bodily
heir of the father, the latter joining in the conveyance. Now, several
years after the expiration of the twenty-year period, this action is
brought by the son to recover the property so conveyed upon the
ground that his attempted conveyance was void because of the
restriction under which he held. The Kentucky court, in affirming
the judgment for the defendant, held that such restraint was reason27
People ex rel. Loomis v. Canal Appraisers, supra, note 22; Smith v. City of
Rochester, supra, note 24; Fulton, L., H., & P. Co. v. State of New York, supra,
note 25; Williams v. City of Utica, supra, note 26; Danes v. State of New York,

N. Y. 67 (1916).
Barb. (N. Y.) 616 (1852).
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29L. 1895, chap. 953 ,sec. I; L. 19o9, chap. 25; chap. 2o of Consolidated Laws.
3
Hudson River Ice Co. v. Brady, 158 App. Div. (N. Y.) 142 (1913).
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able and a valid restriction and that an alienation made in violation
of the deed was voidable, not void.
It is not the purpose of this note to treat the question as to that
part of the restriction which deals -with restraining alienation to the
bodily heirs of the father, but to limit itself to a discussion of the
restriction of the alienation of the fee simple for a limited period.
It is submitted that this case, although in accord with the Kentucky
doctrine as regards this question, is contra to the weight of authority.'
The basis for the rule followed by the majority of the courts is
that any restriction upon the power of transfer of an estate in fee
simple is repugnant to such an ownership. A grant of an estate
in fee simple implies in its very nature the right to the absolute
ownership of the land so conveyed, and to restrict the power of alienation, even for a limited period, is to deprive such an estate of one
of its essential elements and inherent characteristics. If one has
the right to impose such a restriction for several years, he might
impose the restriction for fifty or even one hundred years, and it
would be extremely difficult to draw the line between restraints for2
a reasonable period and those for unreasonable lengths of time.
Furthermore, if what A holds is not alienable, the result is that A
has and has not a fee simple at one and the same time, for A, holding
a fee simple, holds an estate which he is not bound to let descend
to his heirs but may sell or convey; and if the condition is that he
must not sell or convey it in any way, but must allow it to descend,
the estate does not answer the description of a fee simple.
Moreover, to permit such restrictions would seem to be against
public policy, because it involves and entangles titles to real property,
thereby leading to endless confusion and ceaseless litigation, which
the law aims to prevent.
One exception, however, to this rule is to be noted, namely, the
case of separate estates in married women. Where a separate estate
is created in a married woman, a restriction on alientaion is held to be
valid.3 The reason for introducing separate estates for married
women was to give to them an equitable interest in property apart
from their husbands and free from their husband's control. Such
estate, however, gave them but imperfect protection because they
were still in danger of parting with their property under the influence
or threats of their husbands. For this reason, the clause against
'Murray v. Green, 64 Cal. 363, at 368 (1883); Fowler v. Duhme, 143 Ind. 248
(1895); Jones v. Port Huron Engine Co., 17, Ill. 502 (1898); Smith v. Kenney,
89 Ill. App. 293 (1899); Clark v. Clark, 99 Md. 356 (1904); Todd v. Sawyer, 147
Mass. 570 (1888); Moore v. Schundehette, 102 Mich. 612 (x894); Roosevelt v.
Thurman, r Johns. Ch. (N. Y:) 220 (1814); Wool v. Fleetwood, 136 N. C. 460
(1904); Anderson v. Cary, 36 Ohio C. C. N. S. 473 (11903); Kepple's Appeal,
53 Pa. 211It (1866); Potter v. Couch, 141 U. S. 297 (1890); ZiUlmer v. Landguth,
94 Wis. 607 (1896).

2Twitty
v. Camp, Phil. Eq. (N. C.) 61 (1866).
3
Baggett v. Meux, i Phil. Ch. (Eng.) 627 (846); Hauser v. City of St. Louis,
170 Fed. 906 (19o9). See also 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 426 and note; Robinson v.
Randolph, 21 Fla. 629 (1885); Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195 (1852); Travis v.
Sitz, 185 S. W. (Tern.) 1075 (1916).

THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
alienation or anticipation, as it is called, was introduced. This
exception to the general rule is applied in the case of Scruggs v. Mayberry, 188 S. W. (Tenn.) 207 (x96), in which the husband executed
a deed by which he conveyed certain land to his wife, the deed providing that neither he nor his wife should have the right of selling it
during their lives, but that the husband should retain the use and
possession of the property. It was held that, a separate estate
having been created in the wife by the direct conveyance to her,
the absolute restraint on the power of alienation was valid but would
have been void, had the interest conveyed been other than a separate
estate. As pointed out by Professor Gray,4 "The well-recognized
exception to the invalidity of restraints on the alienation of life
interests which prevails in the case of the separate estate of married
women, is perfectly consistent with the general doctrine which
underlies this whole subject. That doctrine is, that it is against
public policy to permit restraints to be put upon transfers which the
law allows. But the common law does not allow married women
to transfer their property. The separate estate which allows a
transfer is the creation of equity, and it cannot be deemed against
public policy for equity to permit its creation to be moulded by a
clause against anticipatioh; for the tendency of such a clause is
only to put the married woman where the common law has always
put her." It is necessary, therefore, to restrain the wife from exercising the power of alienation during coverture in order to attain the
benefit of the separate estate. A restraint of this kind is not effectual,
however, while the woman is single.5
What was the old rule and what now represents the minority view,
viz., that restrictions on the power of alienation limited as to time
are valid, 6 is in accord with the Kentucky case and may be called,
for convenience, the Kentucky doctrine.7 The reason for this rule
is based largely upon a misconception of Large's Case.8 In this case
A, seized of lands in fee, devised them to his wife until his son William
should come of the age of twenty-two years, remainder as to part
of such lands to his two sons, X and Y, the remainder as to the other
part to two other of his said sons, upon the condition that "if any of
his sons, before William shall come to the age of twenty-two, shall
sell any part of the same, he shall forever lose the lands and the same
shall remain, etc." One son, prior to the time when William reached
twenty-two, leased the land devised to him. It was held that the
4

Gray, Restraints on Alienation, sec. 269.
6Robirson v. Randolph, supra, note 3.
6Large's Case, 2 Leon. (Eng.) 82 (1857); Oxley v. Lane, 35 N. Y. 340 (1866);
Mtnroe v. Hall, 97 N. C. 2o6 (t887); Ex parte Watts, I53 N. C. 237 (1902); Re
Weller, 16 Ont. App. 3518 (1888); Cowell v. Springs Co., ioo U. S. (1879); Libby
v. Clark, ss8 U. S. 250 (1886), at p. 255; M'Williams v. Nisley, 2 Serg. & Rawle
(Pa.)
507 (I816).
7

Kentland Coal Co. v. Keen, 168 Ky. 836 (1916); 166 Ky. 311 (5955); Lawson
v. Lightfoot, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 217 (1905); Smith v. Isaac, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 172
(1904); Wallace v. Smith, 68 S. W. (Ky.) 131 (1902); Call v. Shewmaker, 24
Ky. L. Rep. 686 (1902); Kean v. Kean, 18 S. W. (KY.) 1032 (1892); Stewart v.
Brady, 3 Bush (Ky.) 623 (1868).

82 Leon. (Eng.) 82, supra, note 6.
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restraint there was good. This case is not authority for the proposition that a restriction or condition in the conveyance of a vested
estate in fee simple against alienating for a limited time is valid,
because the condition against alienation was a condition attached
to a contingent remainder, which was not to vest until William
reached twenty-two. The remainder might never vest at all and
could never vest should William die before he reached the age of
twenty-two. The interest of the son, therefore, being merely
contingent, 9 the non-alienation of such interest was a condition
precedent to the vesting and the provision against alienation, until
the time of vesting, was valid.
It would seem, therefore, that the Kentucky courts persist in
following a rule based largely upon a misconception and a rule
which is now generally abandoned in America.
J. R. Schwartz, '8.
Release: Fraud as Ground to set Aside a Release.-It is not an
infrequent occurrence that after an injured party has signed a release
of a claim for personal injuries due to negligence, where the liability
of the other party is probable, the releasor discovers that his injuries
are more serious than he anticipated, or that for other reasons the
amount he has been allowed under the release is inadequate. He
then seeks to set aside the release. The facts of each particular case
must be carefully scrutinized to determine upon what ground the
release may be avoided. Some cases may be resolved upon the
ground of fraud, because of the fraudulent representations of the
person securing the release, and such representations may be either
as to the nature or the character of the injury sustained or as to the
inport or character of the paper signed. Often cases may be resolved
upon the ground of mutual mistake of the parties; and some upon
the ground of an innocent false representation upon the part of the
person inducing the release.
Smith v. Rhode Island Co., 98 Atl. (R. I.) x (1956), is a recent
example of a case wheie the contract of release was rescinded because
of the fraudulent representation of the agent securing the release.
In this case the plaintiff asked for rescission of the release upon the
ground that the claim agent said to the plaintiff before he signed the
release that Dr. Berry, the attending physician, had told him (the
agent) that the plaintiff would be out at work in two weeks. It was
found.that Dr. Berry had not so stated, and that the agent knew that
he had not. The court held that the misrepresentation made by the
claim agent constituted fraud invalidating the release which the
plaintiff signed, relying thereon.'
9

Mandlebaum v. McDonnell, 29 Mich. 78 (1874).
For cases where rescission was allowed upon similar facts, see Edmunds v.
So. Pac. Co., 123 Pac. (Cal.) 8p1 (1912); Owens v. Norwood-White Company,
133 N. W. (Ia.) 716 (1911); Mattson v. Eureka Lumber Co.,-T Wash. 266
(914); Peterson v. Chic. & St. Paul Ry. CO., 38 Minn. 511 (x888); Marple v.
Minn. & St. Paul Ry. Co., i i5 Minn. 262 (191x); Fleming v. Brooklyn Heights
Ry. Co., 95 App. Div. (N. Y.) xio (i9o4); Haight v. White Way Co., 145 N. W.
(Ia.) 473 (i914).
1
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Accepting this finding by the jury that the agent made the false
statement with knowledge of its falsity, the questions arise as to
whether it was as to a material fact, and whether plaintiff had a
right to rely and did rely upon it? When will the misrepresentation
of a material fact constitute fraud? First, there must under the
general rule, be an affirmative statement of some fact as distinguished
from a concealment or failure to disclose, or from a mere expression
of opinion. Secondly, the statement of that fact must have induced
the person to whom it was made to enter into the contract. It is sometimes erroneously supposed that a misrepresentation cannot be
made of a matter of opinion. However, when the statement,
although relating to a matter of opinion, is the affirmation of a fact,
it may be a fraudulent misrepresentation. 2 It will be noticed that
the fraudulent statement was here made by the defendant's agent
in respect to the opinion of a third person. Granting that plaintiff
would have a right to rely upon the professional opinion of the doctor
himself, does he have the same right to rely upon the statements of
the agent who is a non-professional person and whose interests
plaintiff must realize are adverse to his own. If the fact is susceptible of accurate knowledge and the speaker may well be presumed
to be cognizant of it, while the other party is ignorant, it may be
relied upon, if an investigation is necessary to determine its validity,
and such facts need not be exclusively within the other party's
means of knowledge.3 This last rule is qualified; and the presumption that the injured party signed upon the false representation of
the agent is precluded where the injured party has had reasonable
opportunity to find out the extent of his injuries after the representa-4
tions by the agent have been made and before signing the release.
Moreover, if the representation is upon its face so improbable that
the person to whom it is made should be put upon his inquiry, he
cannot rely upon it as constituting fraud. Of course, the situation
of the parties and the intelligence of the party defrauded must in all
cases be taken into consideration.5
A release may be set aside on the ground of fraudulent representation as to the character of the instrument itself. In this class of
cases it might be more properly said that there was no release at all
because the mind of the releasor never went out to a paper of that
character. He thought that he was-signing a paper of an entirely
different character,' or it may be that because of mental and physical7
weakness he cannot in reason be said to have known what he signed.
2

See Pomeroy's Eq. Juris., vol. II, secs. 877-878;

sec. 61, at p.

12 R.

C. L., Fraud and Deceit,

229.

'1o
Cyc. 33; 14A. & E. Encyc. of Law and cases cited; see also cases in note I,
supra.
4
Hardister v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 177 S. W. (Ark.) 918 (1935)
534
Cyc. 1O6O and cases cited.
6
7Alexander v. Brogley, 63 N. J. L. 307 (1899).
Ind. D. & W. R. Co. v. Fowler, 66 N. E. (Ill.) 394 (1903); Platt v. Am. Plaster
Co., 151 N. W. (Ia.) 403 (915); Conner v. Dundee Ch. Works, 17 At. (N. J.)
975 (89 9 ); Erickson v. N. W. Paper Co., 95 Minn. 356 (905); Texas & P. Ry.
Co. v. Hubbard, z69 S. W. (Tex.) IO58 (1914).
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The most common case of fraud of this sort is where the character
of the paper is misstated to the releasor, he believing that he is
signing a receipt, or paper of like import."
There is another class of cases where rescission is sought upon the
ground of mutual mistake of both parties. In analyzing this class
of cases caution is necessary, because facts which upon first sight
appear sufficient to constitute a ground for rescission because of
mutual mistake may be found to be without merit upon a closer
examination. For example, in the case of Kowalke v. Ry. Co., 9
plaintiff was injured by jumping from defendant's car in an emergency
and the company's liability was probable. She was a woman of
intelligence and the mother of three children and had passed by
about a week the period of her menstruation. The company's
physician and her own doctor visited her after the accident and
learned that she was having a slight uterine hemorrhage. The
question of her pregnancy was raised. She refused to submit to an
examination and believed she was not pregnant. It is to be noticed
that she was not ignorant of the fact that she was pregnant. The
doctors were not sure that she was pregnant. Thereafter she joined
with her husband in executing a release of all claims and demands.
About two weeks later she suffered a miscarriage, and the plaintiff
claimed rescission of the contract on the ground of mutual mistake.
Rescission was not allowed. The doubtful fact is here material, and
the plaintiff had the right to refuse to settle until that uncertainty
was removed, or she might have settled everything else and expressly
omitted from the settlement this specified contingency. What the
plaintiff did was to make a settlement in terms complete, and the
uncertainty is included among the other facts covered by the settlement. The parties are presumed to have intended the apparent
effect of their acts. In order to invalidate a release because of
mutual mistake the mistake must relate to a past or present fact
material to the contract and not to an opinion respecting future
conditions as results of present facts." Where the release given
states the particular injuries compensated for and there were other
injuries unknown to both parties, there is such a mistake of fact
as will invalidate the release and equity will give relief against
the use of the release to bar the claim for damages for the injury
8

Wray v. Chandler, 64 Ind. 146 (1878); Austin v. St. Louis Transit Co., 115

Mo. App. 146 (19o5); C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Howard, 14 App. D. C.

262 (1900);

Great No. Ry. Co. v. Karische, 104 Fed. 44o (igoo).
9io6
Wis. 472 (1899).
I0For cases where rescission was sought upon ground of mutual mistake, see
Chic. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Wilcox, 116 Fed. 913 (1902); Bordenv. Sandy River Co.,
1io Me. 327 (1913); Ry. Co. v. Bennett, 63 Kan. 78, (1901); Seeley v. Citizen's
Traction Co., 36 AtI. (Pa.) 229 (1897); Homuth v. St. Louis Ry. Co., 129 Mo.
629 (1895).
For cases resolved upon the ground of mutual mistake, see Culbertsonv. Blanchard, 79 Tex. 486 (189x); Tatman v. Phila. B. & W. R. Co., 85 Ati. (Del.) 716
(i913); Wilson v. Ins. Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 674 (1881).
"Nelson v. Chic. R. Co., iii Minn. 193 (i91o); Houston Co. v. Brown, 69 S.W.

(Tex.) 651

(1902).
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unknown at the time of the release.12 In these cases of so-called
mistake care should be taken to determine whether the facts amount
to merely a disappointed expectation. If the party gets in fact all
that he. contracted for, although not all that he expected or hoped
for, no question of operative mistake is involved.
Rescission is sometimes sought upon the ground of innocent
false representation on the part of the releasee, intended to be acted
upon by the releasor and relied upon by him. These facts, if proved,
are sufficient to set aside the release in equity. However, cases
resolved upon the ground of innocent false representation are comparatively rare. In Great Northern Railway Company v. Fowler,3
there was a clear mistake of fact as to the nature of the injury.
Plaintiff was a brakeman on defendant company's road and was
injured by reason of the company's negligence. Defendant's physician believed and informed plaintiff that the injury was only a
scalp wound. It developed that plaintiff was so seriously injured
that a serious operation on the skull was required and that the
plaintiff would never be able to again resume work. The release
was held to be subject to vacation and, upon principle, rightly so. 4
In this class of cases neither party has knowingly deprived the other
of any legal right, but if the acts of the parties are allowed to stand
the releasor has lost a valid legal right through no fault of his own,
but by the innocent false representation of the releasee, who under
such circumstances should not be allowed to deprive the releasor of
his legal rights although he does so unknowingly. There is no
particular 'difficulty in dealing with this class of cases, as they may
be rescinded in equity for exactly the same reasons as any other
contract induced by innocent false representation."
Lowell H. Teeter, '18.
Sales: ConditionalSales Distinguishedfrom Leases.-In Bramhall,
Deane Co. v. McDonald, Y72 App. Div. (N. Y.) 78o (1916), the plaintiff
delivered to the defendant certain articles of kitchen and pantry
equipment. The defendant agreed to pay as rent the sum of $8og,
the agreed value of the articles, $450 on the receipt of the goods
and the remainder in equal installments to be paid monthly. The
defendant also agreed to return the property at the expiration of the
lease, but if at that time, the full rent having been paid, the defendant
desired to purchase the property, she might do so upon paying to the
plaintiff "the sum of $i.oo as the purchase price of same." The
parties agreed that the instrument was to be deemed a "lease" and
not a sale of the property. Action was brought upon this instrument
to foreclose it as a lien upon chattels, under sec. 139 of the Municipal
nLumley v. Wabash R. Co., 76 Fed. 66 (1896); Railroad Co. v. Artist, 6o Fed.
365 (1894).
11r36 Fed. 118 (1905).

14Houston R. Co. v. Brown, supra,note i i; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v.
Morgan, I71 S.W. (Ark.) i187 (x914); Reddington v. Blue & Raferty, 149 N. W.
(Ia.)
15 933 (I914).
Simon v. Goodyear Co., io5 Fed. 573 (I9OO); Twitchell v. Bridge, 42 Vt. 68
(1867).

NOTES AND COMMENT
Court Act in force at the time in New York City, which provided
that any instrument showing a conditional sale should be deemed to
create a lien upon chattels which could be foreclosed. The question
before the court, therefore, was whether this instrument was evidence
of a conditional sale or a lease, upon the determination of which
depended the plaintiff's right to foreclose and the defendant's right
to set up a counterclaim for breach of warranty. The court held
the agreement to be a conditional sale, thereby allowing the plaintiff
to foreclose and the defendant to set up the counterclaim.
The question involved has caused the courts of this country a great
deal of trouble. On principle, the distinction between a lease and a
conditional sale is obvious. A lease contemplates only the use of
the property for a limited time, and the return of it to the lessor at
the expiration of that time. A conditional sale on the other hand,
contemplates the ultimate ownership of the property by the buyer,
together with the use of it in the meantime. 1 In practice, however,
due to the many attempts to evade conditional sales recording acts
by drawing these agreements in the form of leases, the courts have
experienced considerable difficulty. The large majority of cases
are those in which the parties style themselves "lessor" and "lessee,"
and the contract states that the property is "hired" or "leased,"
and that the lessee shall make certain payments called "rent,"
amounting in all to the real value of the property, upon the full
payment of which, title to the property shall vest in the lessee.
The majority of American jurisdictions hold such contracts to be
conditional sales. 2 In a contract of sale, whether absolute or conditional, it seems there must be an agreement, either express or implied,
that the vendee will pay the purchase price.' The mere fact that
an instrument is called a lease is of little importance. The court is
not bound by either the name or form of the agreement, but always
looks to its purpose, that is, ascertains whether or not the ultimate
intention was the vesting of property in the vendee or lessee. 4 The
'Williston, Sales, sec. 336.
'Parke, etc., Co. v. White River Lumber Co., ioi Cal. 37 (894);
Coors v.
Reagan, 96 Pac. (olo.) 966 (i9o8); Loomis v. Bragg, 5o Conn. 228 (1882);
Hine v. Roberts, 48 Conn. 267 (188o); Staunton v. Smith, 65 Atl. (Del.) 593
('906); Puffer v. Peabody, 59 Ga. 295 (877); Murch v. Wright, 46 Ill. 487
(1868); Currier v. Knapp, 17 Mass. 324 (1875); Campbell v. Atherton, 92
Me. 66 (1898); Gerrish v. Clark, 64 N. H. 492 (1887); Cooper v. Philadelphia
Worsted Co., 57 Atl. (N. J.) 733 (1904); Jacob v. Haefelein, 54 App. Div. (N. Y.)
570 (I9OO); Equitable General Providing Co. v. Eisentrager, 34 Misc. (N. Y.)
179 (1901); Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Cole, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 439 (I88O); Whitcomb v. Woodworth, 54 Vt. 544 (1882).
3Union Stock Yards, etc., Co. v. Western Land Co., 59 Fed. 49 (1893); In re
Galt, 120 Fed. 64 (903).
'Cutler Mail Chute Co. v. Crawford, 152 N. Y. Supp. 750 (1915); In re Morris,
156 Fed. 597 (907); Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664
(1876). In Union Stock Yards, etc., Co. v. Western Land Co., supra, note 3,
the court said, "In a contract of conditional sale, the agreement may be masked
so as to give it the appearance of an agreement to pay for the use. In such, case,
the court must ascertain the real intention of the contracting parties from the
whole agreement, read in the light of all the surrounding circumstances."
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character of the instrument will not be changed simply because it
contains a provision that the "lessor" shall have the right to repossess
himself of the chattels, 5 or for the insurance of the property for the
benefit of the transferor, or a promise by the lessee to return the
article on demand.7 It seems, also, that by the majority rule, the
payment of a nominal sum over and above the "rent," as in the
principal case, before title will be conveyed, does not prevent the
transaction from being classed as a conditional sale. 8 It is always a
question of law for the court 9to decide as to whether or not the
contract is one of sale or lease.
The greatest difficulty is experienced when the agreement does
not bind the so-called "lessee" to buy, but merely gives him an option,
as in the principal case. The essential thing in these contracts, as in
those where the agreement to buy is absolute, is the intention of the
parties. The fact that the contract contains an option to purchase
does not make it per se a conditional sale,10 nor, where the contract
provides for the payment of a sum substantially equivalent to the
real value of the property, does the fact that the buyer has only an
option to become the owner preclude it from being construed as a
conditional sale." There seems to be no good reason for holding
that such contracts are not conditional sales, as the fact "that the
buyer has the option of becoming the owner and thus a sale is not
sure to take place, is of but small importance, for as a practical matter
the buyer will always be willing to accept ownership when he has
paid the price."' 2 There are, however, some cases in which the sum
to be paid is out of all proportion to the real value of the property,
but in which there is an option in favor of the purchaser to buy for a
certain sum. Such an agreement, it seems, would not be construed
as a conditional sale.3
The decisions in New York State seem to be in harmony with the
holding laid down in the principal case. 3a In New Jersey it has been
Uiz re Angeny, I5I Fed. 959 (1907); Miller v. Steen, 30 Cal. 403 (I866);
Hine v. Roberts, supra,note 2; Hays v. Jordan, 85 Ga. 741 (1890); Rosenbaum v.
App. 648 (1904); Bean v. Edge, 84 N. Y. 5IO (1881).
114 Ill.
King,
6
Palmer v. Howard, 72 Cal. 293 (1887).
7
Gross v. Jordan, 83 Me. 380 (189i).
sHerring-Marvin Co. v. Smith, 43 Ore. 315 (903); Quinn v. Parke, etc.,
Machinery Co., 5 Wash. 276 (1892); Vette v. J. S. Merrill Drug Co., 117 S. W.
(Mo.) 666 (i909).
v. King, supra, note 5.
gRosenbaum
' 0Cutler Mail Chute Co. v. Crawford,. supra, note 4.
"Unmack v. Douglass, 75 Conn. 633 (I9O3); Tomlinson v. Roberts, 25 Conn.
477 (2857); Vette v. J. S. Merrill Drug Co., supra, note 8; Lauter v. Isenreath,
72 Atl. (N. J.) 56 (I909); In re Vandewater & Co., 219 Fed. 627 (1915); Central
Union Gas Co. v. Browning, 21o N. Y. 10 (1913); Weiss v. Leichter, 113 N. Y.
Supp.
999 (i909); Singer Manufacturing Company v. Nash, 70 Vt. 434 (2898).
32From Professor Bogert's notes to sec. x, Proposed Uniform Conditional Sales
Act.
13Cutler Mail Chute Co. v. Crawford, supra, note 4. See also the opinion in
v. Reagan, supra, note 4.
Coors
13 Gardner v. Town of Cameron, 155 App. Div. (N. Y.) 750 (1913), affirmed

without opinion,
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(1915).

Also see New York cases cited in notes
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4, 5, and ii, supra.
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held that where there is no provision as to the vesting of title in
the vendee, the contract is not a conditional sale.3b In Pennsylvania
the cases are by no means harmonious. In a late case 4 a transaction
similar to that in the principal case was held to have a double aspect,
namely, that of a hiring or bailment and that of a conditional sale.
In the earlier case of Ott v. Sweatman5 the court held that the important thing was not the name applied to the instrument, but its
"essential character." Nevertheless, in many cases in which the
so-called rent operated as the purchase price, the transaction has
been regarded as one of bailment or lease rather than of conditional
sale. 6 In Cincinnati Equipment Co. v. Strang17 the transaction was
held to be a lease, even though the goods were to become the property
of the buyer on the payment of ten dollars in addition to the so-called
"rent". In this case, the rentals amounted to several thousand
dollars. In view of such a decision, says Professor Williston, 18
little credit can be given to the statement of the Pennsylvania court
that the important thing is the "essential character of the
instrument." In another late case,' 9 upon facts almost identical
with those in the principal case, the court held the agreement to
be one of bailment and not of sale.
In some states20 there are statutes which class as conditional sales
those leases which are substantially equivalent thereto. These
statutes do not attempt to define just what characteristics a lease
must have to make it equivalent to a conditional sale. Professor
Bogert 2" in his tentative draft of the proposed Uniform Conditional
Sales Act includes in his definition of the term conditional sale,
"any contract for the bailment or leasing of goods by which the bailee
or lessee contracts to pay as compensation a sum substantially
equivalent to the value of the goods, and the bailor or lessor contracts
that the bailee or lessee is to become, or is to have the option of
becoming, or is obligated to become, the owner of such goods upon
full compliance with the terms of the contract." The adoption of
such a section would go a long way toward eliminating the difficulty
which the courts have experienced in regard to this question.
To summarize, it would seem that the important criterion is the
intention of the contracting parties, as evidenced by the instrument
labSinger
Manufacturing Co. v. D. Wolff & Co., 70 N. J. L. 127 (1903).
4
Kelly Springfield Road Roller Co. v. Schlimme, 220 Pa. St. 413 (19o8).
15x66 Pa. St. 217 (1895).
'8 Brown v. Billington, 163 Pa. St. 76 (1894); Stiles v. Seaton, 200 Pa. St. 114
(19O1); In re Angeny, supra, note 5; In re Morris, supra, note 4.
1721s Pa. St. 475 (19o6).
' 8Williston, Sales, page 528, note 67.
"Groves v. Lewis, 53 Pa. Sup. Ct. 511 (1913).
"Alabama, Code of 1907, see. 3394; Iowa, Annotated Code of 1897, sec. 2905;
Maine, Revised Statutes of 1903, chap. 113, sec. 5; Missouri, Revised Statutes
of I9O9, sec. 2889; Ohio, Page & Adams Ann. Gen. Code of 1912, see. 8568;

Washington, R. & B. Ann. Stats., see. 3670, as amended by Laws of 1915,
chap. 95; Wyoming, Compiled Statutes of I9IO, see. 3745.
2"Professor in Cornell University College of Law, whose tentative draft of a
Uniform Ccnditional Sales Act was presented to the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, at Chicago, in August, 1916.
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itself and all the surrounding circumstances. That the amount of
money to be paid under the contact is practically equivalent to
the real value of the chattel and that the ultimate result of the transaction will probably be to vest the title to the property in the so-called
lessee, though not conclusive, is strong evidence that the contract
is one of conditional sale. The decision in each case must depend
upon its particular facts.
W. J. Gilleran, 'x8.
Torts: Fraud: Is the Defendant's Honest Belief in the Truth of his
Representationsa Good Defense to an Action of Deceit? In Schlechter
v. Felton, 158 N. W. (Minn.) 813 (1r6), the plaintiff bought a small
tract of land from the defendant, who represented it to contain a
certain number of acres. Upon investigation after the purchase,
which was in reliance upon this representation, the plaintiff found
that the tract did not contain the number of acres represented, and
brought action in deceit against the defendant to recover damages
sustained by reason thereof. The court held that where the defendant has made a false representation of a material fact, susceptible
of knowledge and relating to a matter in which he has an interest,
and as to which he may be expected to have knowledge, and makes
such statement unqualifiedly and as of his own knowledge, and with
intent to induce action, he cannot be heard to say, after the statement has been acted upon by the plaintiff to his damage, that he
honestly believed that the statement he made was true. The opinion seems to assume that the defendant had such honest belief, and it
therefore involves the question of whether or not honest belief is
a defence to an action for fraud. It is clear that the defendant's
erroneous statement was one of fact, not one of opinion.
The action of deceit in its development went through various forms
and stages, growing out of a great chaos of principles. The early
stages were marked by great conflicts, not only as to the rules governing the action, but also as to their application. Not until 1789 did
the confusion begin to merge into a definite form. At that time
in the decision of the noted case of Pasley v. Freeman1 the action
of deceit took one definite aspect and ever since it has not been
doubted that one who makes a statement of fact which he knows to
be false for the purpose, or apparent purpose, of inducing another
to act, is liable for the damage caused by the action which he induced.
From this decision has grown our modern conception of the action.
There have grown up alongside, however, various conflicts of opinion.
In this Minnesota case we have squarely presented one question
of the kind, namely, in an action based upon false representations,
is honest belief of the defendant in the truth of his representations
a good defense?
The early English doctrine was that such belief was a good defense,
it being based upon the principle that the plaintiff should have made
proper investigation of any such statements made by the defendant.
13 T. R. 51 (1789).
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There were, however, some exceptions to be found, one of which is
brought out in the case of Brownlie v. CampbellP in which it was
held that if, when a man thinks it highly probable that a thing exists,
he chooses to say that he knows it exists, that is really asserting
what is false, it is positive fraud.
The later English doctrine is marked by the decision in the leading
case of Derry v. Peek' which establishes the rule that unless the relation
of the parties is such as gives rise to a duty to use care in ascertaining
and stating the truth, recklessness or carelessness, however gross,
in stating material facts does not amount to fraud; but that to render
the misrepresentations actionable the statement must be made either
with a knowledge of its falsity, or without knowing or caring whether
it is true or false, and without any belief in its truth. The effect
of this ikile is that the honest belief of the speaker in the truth of
his statement absolves him from liability regardless of the sufficiency
of the grounds upon which his belief is based; an absence of reasonable
grounds for his belief being regarded as inconclusive evidence of
fraud. The principle established by this case still appears to be the
law of England 4 and it has found its way into America in practically
the same form. 5 The general American rule is that, if the speaker
honestly believes in the truth of his representations, he is not liable,
an honest mistake or error in judgment being
regarded as insufficient7
6
grounds on which to base a charge of fraud. New York is in accord.
The cases are subject to a sharp distinction and many are so close
that they may be construed to support either side of the question.
A distinction lies between those cases in which the speaker has an
actual belief in the truth of the precise representations which he
makes, and those in which he states in effect that he knows, when he
has in fact a mere uninformed belief. It is well settled that to support
an action for deceit based upon a false representation, such representation must be either false to the knowledge of the party who makes it,
or be made as a positive assertion calculated to convey the impression
that he has actual knowledge of its truth when in fact he has no such
knowledge. In making out a case of the latter type it is not enough
for the plaintiff to show that the statement was false, and was made
negligently or without reasonable ground for belief in its truth.
He must go further and show that the defendant did not have an
honest belief in its truth. 8
As brought out in Derry v. Peek, supra, if the circumstances of the
parties to the action are such that they give rise to a duty on the part
25 App. Cas. 925, 953 (1880).
314 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
"Low v. Bouverie, (1891) 3 Ch. 82; Angus v. Clifford, (1891) 2 Ch. 449.
5

Nash v. Minnesota Title Ins. Co., 163 Mass. 574 (1895); Kountze v. Kennedy,

147 N. Y. 124 (1895).
6

Tucker v. White, 125 Mass. 344 (1878); Kountze v. Kennedy, supra, note 5;

Marsh v. Falker, 40 N. Y. 562 (1869); Williams v. McFadden, 23 Fla. 143 (1887);

Johnson v. Beeney, 9 Ill. App. 64 (1881).
7Marsh v. Falker, supra, note 6.
sWilman v. Mizer, 60 Ark. 281 (1895); Boddy v. Henry, 113 Iowa 462 (I9O1);

Willdns v. Standard Oil Co., 70 N. J. L. 449 (1904); Daly v. Wise, 132 N. Y.
306 (19o2).
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of the speaker to ascertain and know the truth of his representations,
it is held in various cases that he is liable for any damage resulting
from action which may be induced by his representations.' Thus
the Minnesota case is in accord with this principle, the circumstances
being such that there was a duty upon the speaker to know how many
acres the tract contained.
The basis for holding the speaker liable in deceit when he has a
mere uninformed belief is that the speaker is conscious either that
he knows or that he does not know the truth of what he states, and
that, when conscious of his ignorance, he assumes to have knowledge,
he acts in bad faith, and must be held to warrant the truth of his
assertion and so is liable.' 0 New York is also in accord with this
principle."
It seems, therefore, that the general rule is that the defendant's
honest belief in the truth of his representations is a good defence to
an action of deceit.
Wayne C. Selby, 'x8.
Torts: Liability for the Erection of a Spite Fence:-The case of
Hibbard v. Halliday, 158 Pac. (Okla.) 1158 (1916), indicates the
increased tendency on the part of the common law courts to view as
pertinent the question of motive. The defendant in this action
erected a brick wall on the edge of his property extending to the
entire length and height of the plaintiff's dwelling, thereby shutting
out his light and air which had hitherto been unobstructed. The
erection of the wall did not benefit the defendant in the least but
was erected by him for the sole purpose of spiting his neighbor.
The court, in a short but excellent outline of the law pertaining to
spite fences, and its history, permitted the plaintiff to recover in
tort for the damage he had suffered. The court accepted the reasoning that "no man can pollute the atmosphere or shut out the light
of Heaven for no better reason than that the situation of his property
is such that he is given the opportunity of so doing, and wishes to
gratify his spite and malice against his neighbor."' It was further
pointed out that an owner of land has a right to make any reasonable
use of his property and when employed for such use may rightfully
injure another, but it was said that under the doctrine sic utere tuo
ut alienum -nonlaedas he may not use it for a wholly wrong purpose.
The English doctrine of the prescriptive right to ancient lights2 is
not generally accepted in this country.3 Under the common law
PWatson v. Jones, 41 Fla. 241 (1899).

IIngalls v. Miller,

121

Ind. x88 (1889); Arnold v. Teel,

182

Mass. 1 (1902);

Gerner v. Mosher, 58 Neb. 135 (1899); Hadcock v. Osmer, 153 N. Y. 604 (1897);
Zinc Co. v. Bamford, i5o U. S. 665 (1893).
nHadcock v. Osmer, supra, note io.
'Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 38o, 389 (1888).
'Cross v. Lewis, 2 Barn. and Cress. 686 (1824); an ancient light is a window
which has been opened for twenty years and enjoyed without molestation by the
owner of the house (i Bouv. Inst., par. 1619).
3Ward v. Neal, 37 Ala. 5oo (1861); Parker v. Foote, ig Wend. (N. Y.) 3,7

(1838).
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there was no tort liability for the erection of a spite fence.4 Thus a
man could erect a wall or fence to any height to which his malice
might prompt him and his motive for so doing would not be inquired
into.5 This was the settled rule in this country until as late as 1888
when the famous case of Burke v. Smith6 was decided. In this case,
which has been followed in at least three states,7 "the authority of
precedents gave way to the paramount demands of justice as well
The question of motive
as the decencies of civilized society."
was inquired into and, upon finding that the defendant erected the
fence in question for the sole purpose of spiting his neighbor, it was
held, Morse, J., writing the opinion, that the obstruction could be
abated as a nuisance. Of course, in these cases there must be an
actual injury to the plaintiff9 and, if the structure be of actual benefit
to the defendant, the plaintiff cannot compel the defendant to provide
light and air for him merely because he has failed so to provide for
himself.10
California, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Washington have enacted statutes imposing liability for erecting spite fences.
These statutes seem to be subjected to a strict construction.1 Such
acts have been held to be a proper exercise of police power.1
New York, however, still adheres to the old common law rule of
no liability, and refuses to inquire into the motive of the defendant.
13
The leading case on the subject in this state is Mahan v. Brown.
It is to be hoped, however, in view of the attitude taken by some of
the lower courts.' 4 that when a new case arises, New York will also
depart from the old common law rule and adopt the new rule as laid
down in the Hibbard case and as first set forth in the Burke case.
Henry Klauber, '17.
Torts: Liability Under the Workmen's Compensation Acts for
InjuriesResulting Out of the State.-The case of Grinnell v. Wilkinson,
98 Atl. (R. I.) io3 (I916), presents a question that has created a
sharp conflict of authority in several jurisdictions. The plaintiff
TFalloon v. Schilling, 29 Kan.

292 (1883);

Mahan v. Brown,

13

Wend. (N. Y.)

2615 (1835); Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73 (1896).
Levy v. Brothers, 4 Misc. (N. Y.) 48 (1893).
6
Supra, note i.
Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala. 381 (1912); Flaherty v. Aloran, 8I Mich. 52
(i8go); Peek v. Roe, 11o Mich. 52 (1896); Barger v. Barringer, 151 N. C. 433
(19o9); Hibbard v. Halliday, i58 Pac. (Okla.) 1158 (i916).
8
Norton
9
Detroit
0

v. Randolph, supra, note 7, at page 386.
Baseball Club v. Deppert, 6I Mich. 63 (1886).
" Rudnick v. Murphy, 213 Mass. 470 (1913).
"Cal. Civil Code, sec. 841 (1885); Maine Rev. L. 1902, C.22, sec. 6; Mass.
Stat. 1887, c. 348; New Hamp. Pub. St., c. 143, sec. 28, 29; Ballinger's Wash.
Code and St., see. 5433; for a strict application see Brostrom v. Laupke, 179
Mass. 315 (1901), where it was held not applicable to a fence situated from 3 to 10
feet from defendant's line.
2Lord v. Langdon, 91 Me. 221 (1889); Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368 (1889);
Smith v. Morse, 148 Mass. 407 (1889); Karaseck v. Peir,

13Supra, note 4.
"4See Pickard v. Collins,

Misc. 482 (IgOI).

23

22

Wash. 419 (1900).

Barb. (N. Y.) 444, 458 (1856): Adler v. Parr, 34
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was employed by a contractor to work in the state of Rhode Island
and, during the course of his master's employment, he was sent into
the state of Connecticut and while there was injured. The trial
court refused to allow a recovery against the master, basing their
opinion upon the ground that the Workmen's Compensation Act
of Rhode Island had no effect upon the employee while without the
state. The holding of the lower court was reversed, the ground for
such decision being that, under the compensation act of the State of
Rhode Island, the relation of employer and employee is contractual,
and the terms of the act are to be read as a part of every contract
of service between those subject to its terms; that on principle and in
reason, in view of the purpose of the act, it should be construed to
include injuries arising out of the state as well as those arising within.
In a recent New York case, Matter of Post v. Burger 6' Gohike,
216 N. Y. 544 (1pr6), a similar controversy was so decided, and the
court in laying down the law said: "The act, in view of its humane
purpose, should be construed to intend that in every case of employment there is a constructive contract between the employer and
employee, general in its terms and unlimited as to territory, that the
employer shall pay as provided by the act for a disability or the death
of the employee as therein stated. The duty under the statute
defines the terms of the contract. * * * The purpose of the legislature would seem to require that the act be read into every contract
of employment and provide compensation for every injury incurred
while engaged in such employment without limitation."
The tort view' of cases arising under similar facts, and the one sustained by the courts of England, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Michigan,
and Minnesota, is to the effect that the plaintiff's cause of action in
such cases is predicated upon his relation of servant to the defendant,
and that the latter's obligation as master is one in tort.
As to tort actions the law is well settled that the liability is determined by the law of the place
where the injury is inflicted without
regard to the law of the forum or the law of the place where the
contract was made.2 The plaintiff's case must stand upon the law of
the place where the injury occurred.
The question now arises, Did the legislature indicate a purpose to
make the terms of the act applicable to injuries received outside
the state? And upon critical examination of the statutes, no such
intent is found by these courts to be expressed. In the absence of
unequivocal language to the contrary, it is not presumed that statutes
respecting this matter are designed to control conduct or fix the
rights of the parties beyond the territorial limits of the state.3
1
Gould's Case, 215 Mass. 480 (1913); Johnson v. Nelson, 128 Minn. x58 (x915);
Schwartz v. India Rubber Co., (1912) 2 K. B. 299; Hicks v. Maxton, (1907)
i B.W. C. C. i5o; Tomalin v. S. Pearson & Son, (i909) oo L. T. 685; Michigan

Industrial Accident Board, April, 1913; see Bradbury, Workmen's Compensation,
35.2
Herrick v. Minneapolis, St. Louis Ry. Co., 31 Minn. '1 (1883); Northern
Pacific R. 1R. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190 (1894); Burns v. Grand Rapids &
Indiana R. R. Co., '13 Ind. 169 (1887).
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The contract view4 is the one sustained by the New York Court
of Appeals, and by the great weight of authority. It is urged in
support of this view that the acts do not purport to provide compensation for a wrong. The compensation is given without reservation
and wholly regardless of any question of wrongdoing of any kind.
Referring to the question of the extra-territorial effect of the acts,
it would seem that the place where the accident occurs is of no more
relevance than is the place of accident to the assured. in an action
on a contract of accident insurance, or the place of death of the
assured in an action on a contract of life insurance. The liability
of the employer depends not upon any fault of his own or his servants,
but upon the answer to the question whether by act or silence he
has adopted the statutory terms.
The workmen's compensation acts are remedial in character and
the provisions should be broadly construed. The legislatures
intended to secure the injured workmen and their dependents from
becoming objects of charity, and this danger is just as great where
the injury occurs outside the state as within it.
If the opposite view were taken, as has been done by a few of the
courts,- the workman would be placed at a great disadvantage.
In the course of his employment it would be dangerous for him to
go without the state on his master's business, for, if there injured,
there would be no recovery, and, if he refused to carry out his master's
instructions, he would be placed in a position without employment.
The acts should be construed in an equitable manner, and the same
public policy that prompted the legislatures to pass such acts demands
that they be broadly construed.
Edward O'Rourke, Jr., '8.
Trusts: Liability of Trust Estate for the Torts of the Trustee.As a general rule, in America, the trust estate it not liable for the
torts of the trustee. This rule is followed in the case of Thompson v.
American Optical Co., z73 App. Div. (N. Y.) 123 (1916), where an
action for damages was brought for a libel written by the attorney
for the trustees. Plaintiff sought to hold the trust property. The
court held that "after the property had been transferred to the trustees under whatever name the trustees did their business their acts
were in fact independent of the corporation and would create no
liability against the corporation."'
3Boston & Maine R. R., v. Trafton, 151 Mass. 229 (1890); Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Mass. 570, 572 (I9OO); Ewen v. Thompson-Starrett Co., 208 N. Y. 245
(1913).

'Matter of Post v. Burger & G6hlke, 216 N. Y. 544 (1916); Kennerson v.
Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367 (i915);
Grinnell v. Wilkinson, 98 Atl.
(R. I.) 103 (1916); Gooding v. Ott, 87 S. E. (W. Va.) 862 (1916); Deeny v.
Wright & Cobb Lighterage CO., 36 N. J. L. J. 121 (1913); Re Edward Schmidt,
Claim No. 6, Ohio State Liability Bd. Awd., cited in Bradbury, Workmen's
Compensation, 34.
5Supra, note i.
'In accord on the same question, Rielle v. Benning, Montreal L. R. 4 Super.
Ct. 219 (1888).
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Law courts are very reluctant in permitting trust funds to be
impaired by the acts of trustees. A court of law regards the trustee
as the legal owner of the trust estate, regardless of what that relation
may be in equity, and as owner, he is liable for the torts committed
2
by him or his agents with reference to the trust estate or fund.
The question as to the liability of a trust estate for the torts of the
trustee most frequently arises with regard to the negligence of the
trustee in conducting a business; for example, where there is management of a railroad by trustees and the plaintiff is injured by reason of
a defective rail; or in maintaining property left by a testator; for
example, where the plaintiff is injured because of a defective sidewalk in front of the property. In the latter class of cases the courts
say that, the legal title being vested in the trustee, the duty to use
reasonable care to see that the property does not fall into disrepair
devolves upon him in his personal capacity, and, if he fails to make
proper repairs, it is a violation of the personal duty which the law
imposes upon him as the owner of the property to keep it safe.
Although the beneficiaries receive the profits and rents, yet they have
no control over the trust property. If follows, therefore, that the
trustee is personally liable for the violation of a personal duty.'
As to those trusts which are more active in their nature; such as
conducting a business or other enterprise, there is a diversity of
opinion. Some courts hold that the estate is not liable for the torts
of the trustee or his agents or employees. The reason for this view
is that the trustee has full power and authority to properly execute
the trust and that it is his duty to employ competent agents and
employees who'are his agents and not those of the trust estate.4
Other courts take the contrary view and hold that the trust estate
may be reached as well as the trustee. As to the theory upon which
liability is established, these courts differ. In a comparatively
recent case the court said the general rule, that the trust fund is not
liable for the torts of the trustee, applies only to passive trusts.5
Other cases establish liability upon the ground that the beneficiaries
took part in the control and management of the business and that
the trustee was under their supervision. 6 Another case goes still
"stand in the shoes of the settlor"
further and holds that the trustees
7
and therefore the estate is liable.
In England, if a trustee has acted with due diligence and reasonably, and has employed proper agents, the liability is borne by the
2
McCue v. Finek, 20 Misc. (N. Y.) 506 (1897); Parmenter v. Barstow 22 R. I.
245 (1900).

3

Gillick v. Jackson 40 Misc. (N. Y.) 627 (2903;) Moniot v. Jackson, 40 Misc.

(N. Y.) 197 (903);

Keating v. Stevenson,

Norling v. Allee, 131 N. Y. 623

21

App. Div. (N. Y.) 604 (1897);

(2892).

4Farlardeau v. Boston Art Students' Association, 282 Mass. 4o5 (I9O3);
Ballou v. Farnum, 9 Allen (Mass.) 47 (2864); McCue v. Finck, supra, note 2.

5Wright v. Caney River Ry. Co., 151 N. C. 529

(1909).

6Miller v. Smythe, 92 Ga. 254 (1892); Cheatham v. Rowland, 92 N. C. 34o
(1885);
Wright v. Caney River Ry. Co., supra, note 5.
7
1reland v. Bowman, 130 Ky. 153 (i9O8).
8Mersey Docks v. Gibbs 1I House of Lords 686 (1866); Benett v. Wyndham,
4 DeGex Fisher and Jones's Rep. 258 (z862).
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estate only8 ; if recovery is had against the trustee, he is entitled
to be indemnified out of the trust fund.9 There are some American
jurisdictions which follow the English view and permit recovery
against the trust fund on the ground that the trustee is acting as
agent for the beneficiaries.' 0
When a trustee makes a false representation with regard to the
trust property, for example, that he will convey the property free
from incumbrances, he is personally liable for such representation.
He has no authority to make such warranties,
1 representations, or
statements unless he intends to bind himself. '
Where a trustee pays the debts of his settlor with rents and profits
which he held fQr the heirs of the settlor, he becomes personally
liable to the heirs in conversion. "The estate, as an entity, is but a
fund, an inanimate thing, incapable of becoming a party to such a
conversion, and hence cannot be made liable for it to those whose
money has been converted.""2
There is no question as to the liability of the trust estate for the
torts of the trustee where the instrument creating the trust expressly
and clearly provides that no liability or responsibility shall result
to the trustee.
H. B. Lermer, 'z7.
Vendor and Purchaser: Right of a Vendee in Possession to Acquire
Outstanding Title.-Misamore v. Berglin, 72 So. (Ala.) 347 (1916),
affirmed a decree of the lower court that a respondent be declared
to hold a certain title that he had obtained in opposition to his
vendor in trust for the latter. The complainant's mediate grantor
claimed the property by inheritance and by quit claim deeds given
him by two heirs. These deeds had not been recorded and could
not be found. The respondent went into possession under an
optional contract of purchase. Discovering the defect in the complainant's record title, the vendee induced the grantors in the quit
claim deeds mentioned above to issue new quit claim deeds direct
to him. These deeds were procured by misrepresentation and without consideration. The respondent had the deeds recorded and then
set up a title in opposition to his vendor and attempted to sell
portions of the land and to encumber it by mortgage. The Supreme
Court, in affirming the decree of the lower court, held that the position
of a vendee in possession is similar to that of a tenant. Like the latter
he is estopped to deny the title of the person under whom he has
been let into possession. The court also held that, since the title
to the property had been obtained by the vendee through misrepresentation and fraud, the law would intercede and make him a
9

In re Raybould, (19oo) i Ch. 199.

1'Wisconsin Central R. R. Co. v. Ross,;142 Ill. 9 (1892); Jones v. Penn. Rail.
road, 19 Dist. of Columbia 178 (189o); Lamphear v. Buckingham, 33 Conn. 237
(1866).
nFritz v. McGill, 31 Minn. 536 (1884); Riley v. Kepler, 94 Ind. 308 (1884).
"Evans v. Hardy, 76 Ind. 527 (1881).

"Prinz v. Lucas,
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Pa. St.

62o (19o5).
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constructive trustee of the title for his vendor. It appears that under
the circumstances of the principal case the vendee was estopped to
deny his vendor's title, but since he had acquired the better legal title
the real object of the action was to have the respondent declared
a constructive trustee of the title for the complainant. The decree
of the lower court to that effect was properly affirmed.
As to whether a purchaser is estopped to deny his vendor's title
there is an apparent conflict of authority. Coke says that one who
accepts an estate from another is estopped to deny the latter's title.'2
There are many decisions laying the rule down in these broad terms.
But it is certain that the rule is subject to qualification. The courts
distinguish between the case of a vendee in possession under a contract
to purchase and the case of a grantee to whom conveyance has been
made. A mere vendee is considered to hold under his vendor and is
estopped to deny the latter's title. The principal case comes within
this rule. But a grantee is deemed to hold adversely to his grantor.
To quote Cyc., 3 "A purchaser, after he has received a deed from the
vendor, holds adversely to him and is not estopped to dispute his
title; he is not precluded from acquiring and asserting as against
him an adverse title." Averill v. Wilson4 holds that "No relation
of landlord and tenant, not even in a qualified sense exists between a
grantor and a grantee." The title of the grantor is extinguished by
the conveyance. The grantee acquires the property for himself
and there is no obligation to maintain the title of the grantor. He
holds adversely to the grantor and is not estopped to deny his title
or acquire any outstanding title. But a vendee in possession under
a contract to purchase, before a conveyance is made, is pledged like
a tenant, to maintain the title of his vendor. Printard v. Goodlo
quotes with approval the holding in Winlock v. Hardy' that, "a tenant
cannot deny the title of his landlord, nor can a person who enters
under a executory contract of purchase, deny the right of him under
whom he enters; for he is a quasi tenant, holding only in virtue of his
vendor's title and by his permission."
It further appears that a grantee cannot deny his grantor's title
for the purpose of avoiding his obligations under the contract of
purchase. Bigelow 7 lays down as the general rule, that a grantee
is not estopped to deny his grantor's title. However, the same
authority states" that a grantee is estopped to deny his grantor's
title so long as he claims under him alone.9 He points out "That a
grantee cannot while holding possession under his grantor, dispute
'Coke, Litt. 352 a, cited in Bigelow, Estoppel (6th ed.), p. 388.
239 Cyc. 1614.
239 Cyc. 16ig.
44 Barb. (N. Y.) 18o (1848). See also Osterhout v. Shoemaker, 3 Hill (N. Y.)
53 (1842); Kenada v. Gardner, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 589 (1848).
Fed. Cas. No. I, 171 (1847). See also Jackson v. Spear, 7 Wend. (N. Y.)
4o (1831); Ogden v. Walker, 6 Dana (Ky.) 420 (1838); 39 Cyc. 1614.
64 Litt. (Ky.) 272, 274 (1823).

7Bigelow, Estoppel (6th ed.), 389.
Bigelowj Estoppel (6th ed.), 389.
'Coakley v.Perry, 3 Ohio St. 344 (1854).
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the grantor's title for the purpose of escaping entirely the payment
of the purchase price of the property."' 0 It would seem that a

grantee cannot deny his grantor's title unless by affirnmatively proving
a better title, and that even then he cannot escape payment of the
purchase price, although he will be entitled to a set-off for whatever
expense he may have incurred in acquiring the better title." He will
be considered a constructive trustee of this title and will be required
to convey it to his grantor. Thus, the grantor's title will be perfected
and through his conveyance to the grantee the title of the latter
will in its turn, be perfected.
In Robertson v. PickrelI'2 the plaintiffs brought an action of ejectment against their grantees. The plaintiffs based their title on an
invalid will. It was proven affirmatively by the grantees that they
held the property under another and better title. The plaintiffs
contended that the defendants who had entered into possession
under the plaintiffs were estopped to deny their title. The court
held that a grantee is estopped from disputing his grantor's title
for the purpose of avoiding the purchase price. He cannot dispute
it so long as he holds under it. But in general a grantee is not
estopped from asserting a superior title where there has been an
absolute conveyance. The court adopted the dictum in Blight's
Lessee v. Rochester.' In that case the court said, "The property
having become by sale the property of the vendee, he has the right
to fortify that title by the purchase of any other which may protect
him in the quiet enjoyment of the premises."
The rules under consideration are further illustrated by the case of
Bush v. Marshall.'4 In that case the vendor sued to foreclose a
mortgage given him by his grantee, as part consideration for the
purchase price of a piece of land deeded to the latter in fee simple
by the plaintiff. When the deeds were given the plaintiff was in
possession of government lands as a tenant by sufferance with the
right of preemption. But it became expedient for him and others
to give up this right and clear their title at public auction. The
defendant bought up the government deeds ahead of his grantor.
He set these up as giving him title to the property. The court held
that, "Bush having obtained possession under Whitesides (his vendor)
cannot, by the purchase of an outstanding title, defeat the claim of
his vendor. Equity treats the purchaser as the trustee of his vendor.
* * * * The vendee cannot disavow the vendor's title." The
court ruled further that the grantee would only be allowed reimbursement for clearing the title. The case is commented upon by Bigelow 5
and he points out and emphasizes the fact that the case does not
hold that a grantee is estopped absolutely from setting up a better
'"Bigelow, Estoppel (6th ed.), 3388.
UKirkpatrick v. Miller, 50 Miss. 521, (1874); 39 Cyc.

i ab. (NY~n.
) 14 (147).
"'109

U. S. 6o8 (1883).

187 Wheat. (U. S.) 535

(1822).

"6 How. (U. S.) 284 (1848).

"Bigelow, Estoppel (6th ed.), 59o.

1620;

Wood v. Perry,

THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
title but that he is estopped from avoiding the purchase price. A
grantee can affirmatively deny his vendor's title by setting up a
better title. Even then he cannot avoid the contract under which
he has entered into possession but will be deemed to hold the better
title in trust for his grantor, being entitled only to a set-off for the
expense he has incurred in obtaining the better title. 6 It is submitted
that the frequent statement of the rule that a purchaser is estopped
to deny his vendor's title is too broad; that the frequent use of either
this statement or its opposite 7 without qualification, -has led to an
apparent conflict of authority; that upon analysis there is no real
conflict.
The main point decided in the principal case is not that the vendee
is estopped to deny his vendor's title, but that he is deemed to hold
the better title in trust for his vendor. The court quotes Pomeroy'
to the effect that when the title to real property has been obtained
through fraud the holder is deemed to hold the same in trust for the
real owner. The trust is imposed against the will of the trustee
and to prevent some fraud attempted by him. This is technically
known as a constructive trust. "The specific instances in which
equity impresses a constructive trust are numberless-as numberless
as the modes by which property may be obtained through bad faith
and unconscientious acts."' 9 Perry says, "The element common to
this class of constructive trusts is that one person has obtained
through an actual wrongful act the legal title to property equitably
belonging to another. 2 0 And the court found in the principal case
that the vendee had obtained the quit claim deeds through misrepresentation. It should be noted that the misrepresentation was
not practiced directly upon the complainant and that it was not of
so positive a nature as would have given him an action at law for
deceit. Pomeroy points out that, "Courts of equity by thus extending the principle of trusts * * * to all cases of actual or constructive fraud and breaches of good faith are enabled to wield a
remedial power of tremendous efficacy in protecting the rights of
property. ' 21 From the authorities quoted and from other cases it
appears that the rules here considered are New York as well as
Alabama law.
H. Mason Olney, '18.
Wills: What Constitutes "Signing" by the Testator.-A question
which is more novel than difficult, as to what constitutes a "signing"
or "subscribing" of a will within the meaning of the statutes, is
presented in the recent case of Matter of Severance, 96 Misc. (N. Y.)
384 (1916). The decedent who was a mechanic, but also a justice
1639 Cyc. 1617, 1620.
17Cummings v. Powell, 97 Mo.
(1908).
'8 Pomeroy,
1209Pomeroy,

524

(1888); Cassin v. Nicholson, 154 Cal. 497

Equity Jurisdiction (3d ed.), vol. 3, sec. lO44.
Equity Jurisdiction (3d ed.), vol. 3, sec. lO44.
Perry, Trusts (6th ed.), 268.
nPomeroy, Equity Jurisdiction (3d ed.), vol. 3, sec. 1O44.
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of the peace, wrote his will on a printed will blank at the bottom of
which was the usual dotted line, followed by the letters "L. S." in
brackets. Instead of signing his name on this line, as is commonly
done, he affixed near the end of it, so that the letters "L. S." were
partially covered, a wafer seal, printed in colors, and containing
this inscription: "Merry Christmas American Red Cross. 1912.
Happy New Year." And written upon this seal in the handwriting
of the testator were the letters, "C. S. Seal C. S." The question
naturally arising is whether the decedent intended the inscription
as his "seal" merely, and neglected to sign his name on the dotted
line, or whether he intended it as his signature and a complete execution of the will.
It was first decided in England that the placing of a seal was of
itself sufficient signing within the statute,' but this was later declared
to be a "very strange doctrine; for if it was so it would be very easy
for one person to forge another man's will." 2 Lord Eldon in passing
on the question in 18i said: "Sealing without signing is not a
sufficient execution of a will."' Later the English court said that
"in such cases where it was held that sealing was not signing, the seals
were not affixed by way of a signature."'4 Where a testator affixed
his seal, and, putting his finger on the seal, said, "This is my hand
and seal," the will was admitted
It is the general rule in England and the United States,6 as laid
down by the cases 7 and writers," that a will signed by a mark or
cross is valid. The courts have been very liberal in construing what
is such a mark or cross. They have admitted wills signed simply
by the testator's initials; 9 by this first name only; 10 by his name not
'Lemayne v. Stanley, 3 Lev. (Eng.) I (1693).
2Smith v. Evans, I Wils. (Eng.) 313 (,751).
3Wright v. Wakeford, 17 Ves. (Eng.) 454 (1811).
'Jenkins v. Gaisford, 3 Sw. & T. (Eng.) 93 (1863).
UIn bonis Emerson, L. R. 9 Ir. 443 (1882).
GThe courts of Pennsylvania in construing their Statute of 1883, taken directly
from the English Act (29 Car. II, sec. 2), held that signing by mark was not
sufficient. See Greenough v. Greenough, ii Pa. 489 (1849). But in 1848 a
statute was passed expressly permitting signing by mark. See Buford v. Buford,
29 Pa. 221 (1857); Knox's Estate, 131 Pa. 220 (189o); Plate's Estate, 148 Pa. 55
(1892).

7Goods of Bryce, 2 Curt. Ece. (Eng.) 325 (1839); Baker v. Dening, 8 Ad. & El.
(Eng.) 94 (838); Smith v. Dolby, 4 Har. (Del.) 350 (1846); Ray v. Hall, 3 Strob.
(S. C.) 297 (1848); Van Hanswyck v. Wiese, 44 Barb. (N. Y.) 494 (I85); Jackson
v. Jackson, 39 N. Y. 153 (1868); Scott v. Hawk, 107 Ia. 723 (1898); Geraghty v.
Kilroy, 103 Minn. 286 (29o8); In re Bullivant's Will, 88 Atl. (N. J.) 2093 (1913);
In re Pope, 139 N. C. 484 (1905); In re Allred, 86 S. E. (N. C.) 2047 (915);

Pool v. Buffum, 3 Ore. 438 (1869) (will made by a blind man). See also 40
Cyc. 1102; 30 Am. & Eng. Ency.'of Law, 584, and 22 L. R. A. 370, for other cases.
81 Jarman on Wills (6th ed.), p. 107; z Schouler on Wills (5th ed.), p. 365;
1 Redfield on Wills (4th ed.), p. 198; 1 Underhill on Wills, p. 254; Gardner on
Wills, p. 183; Theobald on Wills (5th ed.), p. 27.
9Goods of Savory, 15 Jur. (Eng.) lO42 (1851); Blewitt's Goods, L. R. 5 Prob.
Div. 116 (188o); Pilcher v. Pilcher, 84 S. E. (Va.) 667 (1915); also see Palmer v.
Stephens, i Den. (N. Y.) 471 (1845), where initials were sufficient signing of a
note; and.Brown v. Bank, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 4 (1844), where numbers "I, 2, 8.,
were held to be a signature on a note.
"'Knox's Estate, supra, note 6.
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properly spelled;" by a wrong or a fictitious name;" or by the wrong
name written by another person around the mark made by the
testator.13 Even an illegible scrawl has been declared to be a sufficient
signature. 14 But in all such cases the testator must intend the mark
as a substitute for his name.1 5 If the testator started to write his
name, and physical weakness prevented him from completing it,
the scrawl"6 or part of the name17 which he wrote will not be sufficient
to execute the will, because of the lack of completed intent. The
civil law, as interpreted in France and Louisiana, declares any
subscription to be sufficient which will serve to identify the testator
as the author of the testament.'
Judge Mitchell, in the Pennsylvania case of Plate's Estate,19
aptly stated the law on this question when he said, "Exactly what
constitutes a signing has never been reduced to judicial formula
* * * *. Whatever the testator * * * * was shown to
have intended as his signature, was a valid signing, no matter how
imperfect, or unfinished, or fantastical, or illegible, or even false,
the separate characters or symbols he used might be, when critically
judged."
Thus, if the testator in Matter of Severance, supra, affixed the Red
Cross Seal and initialed it animo testandi, it would clearly be hard
to rule that such was not "signing" or "subscribing" the will, in
the sense prescribed by the statutes. The surrogate found the
necessary intent to exist, basing his finding upon the facts that the
paper was put in an envelope upon which the testator had written,
"Last will of Chas. S. Severance," and that the disposition of the
property was natural. Also, since the amount of the estate was
small and the will was not contested, the court did not feel called
upon to be too astute in searching for reasons to reject the will.
0. R. Clark, '18.
"Word v. Whipps, 28 S. W. (Ky.) 1I (1894); Boone v. Boone, I4 Ark. 69
(1914); Succession of Bradford, 124 La. 44 (I9O9).
"Goods of Glover, ii Jur. (Eng.) 1022 (1847); In Redding's Goods, i4 Jur.
(Eng.) 1052 (185o).
"Goods of Clarke, i Sw. & T. (Eng.) 22 (1858); Vernon v. Kirk, 30 Pa. 218
(1858); Baileyv. Bailey, 35 Ala. 687 (I86O); Goods of Douce, 2 Sw. & T. (Eng.)
593 (1862); Rook v. Wilson, z42 Ind. 24 (I895).
"Hartwell v. McMaster, 4 Redf. (N. Y.) 389 (z88o); Sheehan v. Kearney,
82 Miss. 688 (I9O3); see also L. R. A. 1915 D 902 for other cases.
15Everhart v. Everhart, 34-Fed. 82 (1888).
"Plate's
Estate, supra, note 6.
"7Knapp v. Reilly, 3 Dem. (N. Y.) 427 (r885); McBride v. McBride, 26 Gratt.
(Va.)
18 476 (1875).
Succession of Bradford, supra, note ii, and French authorities cited therein.
"Supra,note 6.

